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Abstract
We develop a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNOs) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to
foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. The operators own
a network infrastructure only in their home country. To allow their subscribers
to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by
foreign MNOs. We show that in absence of international alliances and capacity
restrictions, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit
prices down to marginal costs. However, operators prefer to form international
alliances in which members mutually provide roaming services at ineciently high
wholesale prices. Alliances serve as a commitment device to soften competition
on the retail market and harm consumers through excessively high per call prices.
Although operators compete in two-part taris for subscribers, wholesale roaming
prices do not exhibit prot-neutrality as do access prices in related models of network interconnection. We also show that international alliances are endogenously
formed if not prevented by regulation.

Keywords: International roaming, vertical relations, regulation
JEL classication: D43; L13; L42; L96

1 Introduction
The European market for international roaming accounts for approximately

e8.5 billion

or 5.7% of the estimated total mobile industry revenues in 2005 (European Commission,
2006). According to the European Commission the market for international roaming is
highly protable and expected to further grow during the next years. By January 2006,
roaming contributed about 12% to the European mobile industry prots (European
Commission, 2006, p.78). This paper considers the formation of
∗

international

alliances
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as an explanation for high and persistent roaming prots even though operators compete
on the retail and wholesale level.
International roaming provides subscribers with the possibility to use their mobile
phone outside their own country, where their home network operator has no coverage.
More precisely, international roaming allows subscribers to use the infrastructure of a

visited

network in order to make

1

and receive calls abroad. In order to provide their

subscribers with this possibility, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) need to conclude
international roaming agreements with other MNOs in the foreign countries.
MNO allows subscribers of a foreign operator to access its network it acts as

tor.

For roaming services, the foreign operators charge

subscribers'

home operator

which in turn charge

retail

wholesale

2

When a

host opera-

prices to the roaming

prices to their subscribers. As

wholesale roaming charges appear as costs for home operators they have a direct impact on the retail prices. Summing up, operators are typically active on two markets:
They oer roaming services to foreign operators and buy roaming services abroad on

wholesale market. In
market for subscribers.

the

addition, they compete in their home country on the

retail

In 2006, the European Commission assessed that both the average roaming retail and
wholesale prices were unjustiably high (European Commission, 2006). For example, it
estimated that the per-minute costs (including a margin for xed costs) of an outgoing
roaming call are approximately 20 cents, while the wholesale prices are on average
about 75 cents and retail prices are roughly

e1.10

(European Commission, 2006, p.

20). Hence the wholesale prices are estimated to amount roughly 4 times the costs for
originating, transmitting and termination of outgoing roaming calls.

This raises the

question why competition has not been eective in the case of roaming.
In this paper we argue that

international 3

alliances of MNOs may result in collu-

sively high wholesale prices which would not be sustainable otherwise. Recently, such
alliances have been formed claiming to facilitate the provision of roaming services.

4

Aliate operators typically agree on special roaming wholesale conditions based on the
promise to direct roaming trac preferably to other alliance members. We show that
because of strategic considerations MNOs prefer to form alliances in order to commit to
procure and to sell roaming services at high prices. Setting high wholesale prices within
an alliance allows to soften competition on the retail market and thereby increases total
prots.
In our model, in each of two equally sized countries two MNOs compete on the
retail market à la Hotelling for subscribers.

5

We ignore nationwide calls and focus

instead on subscribers' demand for roaming calls abroad.

6

To provide this service,

1 Subscribers can make calls back to their home country, call a local number in the visited country
or call a third country.

2 The technical and contractual conditions for concluding and implementing international roam-

ing agreements between GSM operators have been standardized by the GSM Association.

See e.g.

Sutherland (2001).

3 International alliances are formed by operators which own networks in dierent countries
4 One example is the Freemove alliance whose web page can be found under http://www.

freemovealliance.com .

Interestingly, the European Commission acknowledges the existence of these

alliances but has not pointed out anti-competitive eects.

5 Our model is similar to existing models of telecommunication in this respect. See e.g. Laont,

Rey, and Tirole (1998a,b)

6 Hence in our model MNOs oer the single service to their subscribers to place roaming calls once
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each operator needs to access to foreign operators' infrastructure. Operators may form
international alliances and promise to procure roaming services exclusively from their
partner network.

In this case they negotiate jointly on wholesale prices.

Operators

may also post wholesale prices and buy roaming services without being aliated in an
alliance.

They rst set the wholesale roaming prices and decide from which foreign

operator to buy roaming services. Then they oer two-part retail taris to potential
subscribers in their home country.
One important peculiarity of roaming compared to models of network-interconnection
is that there is no competitive bottleneck in the sense that no particular foreign operator has to provide the roaming services.

7

Operators may thus freely choose with

which foreign MNO they conclude a roaming agreement. Competition among foreign
operators to act as host operator for a MNO should therefore drive down wholesale
prices for roaming services. However, we show that a preferred alternative is to form
international alliances and to mutually agree on high wholesale roaming prices. Within
an alliance each member acts as home operator for its own subscribers and as host operator for the partner's foreign subscribers. High wholesale prices are perceived as high
marginal costs and hence render it optimal to set higher retail prices, thereby softening
price competition in the retail market.

However, expenses on the wholesale market

are retrieved by providing roaming services to the subscribers of the partner network
as long as the international trac is balanced. In short, as retail prices are strategic
complements when competing for subscribers on the home market, committing to high
retail prices via high wholesale prices allows to raise the equilibrium prots.
Our ndings are interesting in the light of recent technological developments that
have increased the strategic importance of roaming alliances. Until recently, operators
had limited technical instruments to determine which foreign network their subscribers
would use.

8

Subscribers that did not manually register in a particular foreign network

were assigned almost randomly among foreign operators. Having little control over the
foreign network which traveling subscribers would use, operators could hardly commit
to keep the roaming trac within partner networks.

In addition, not being able to

direct subscribers to networks that oer cheaper roaming services induced MNOs to
charge high wholesale prices.

9

By now, technologies have been developed that allow

to direct roaming trac. In 2006, the European Commission estimated that roughly
80% of the roaming trac was already actively directed by the use of these technologies
(European Commission, 2006, p. 24). If operators have the ability to select the host
network they may commit by help of alliances to use the networks of other aliated
operators even if these charge higher wholesale prices.
Relative to the existing literature, we nd novel and surprising results. Our model
they are abroad. However, we believe that the issues discussed in this paper are specic to roaming
calls and orthogonal to other services usually oered by MNOs. At the loss of simplicity other services
like nationwide mobile phone calls could be easily integrated.

7 In models of interconnected networks subscribers usually become member at one particular network

such that this operator becomes monopolist for the access to this subscriber. The fact that there is ex
ante competition for subscribers but an de-facto monopoly of access ex post is denoted as competitive
bottleneck. See e.g. Armstrong (2002); Armstrong and Wright (2007)

8 For an detailed technical description, see e.g. Stumpf (2001), Salsas and Koboldt (2004) or Euro-

pean Commission (2005).

9 We show in section 7, that in the absence of control regarding the host network the wholesale

prices may even exceed the monopoly level.
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exhibits what Carter and Wright (1994) call

symbiotic production :

Each operator oers

roaming services as intermediate products to foreign operators, and resells roaming
services from foreign operators to own subscribers. Similar to Carter and Wright (1994)
but unlike the models of national telecommunication,

10

operators of dierent countries

do not compete for the same subscribers. Carter and Wright (1994) assume that there
is only one operator in each country and nd that double marginalization leads to
ineciently high retail prices. They conclude that both operators and consumers would
be better o if operators cooperated and bilaterally reduced their wholesale prices. In
contrast, we show that this argument does not apply when there is competition both
on the retail and intermediate product markets. In absence of alliances, competition
between foreign operators drives down wholesale prices and competition in two-part
taris on the home market induces operators to avoid dead-weight losses by oering
calls at perceived marginal costs and assure prots via a xed payment. Hence in our
model, subscribers could place roaming calls at an ecient price level if international
alliances were forbidden.
The role of the wholesale roaming prices in our setup is similar to that of the
access prices in the two-way network interconnection model of Laont, Rey, and Tirole
(1998a). They nd that higher access prices may soften competition and produce higher
equilibrium prices if network operators compete on the retail market in linear prices.
However, they also show that if operators compete in two-part taris, the collusive
power of access prices vanishes. In contrast, we nd that higher wholesale prices allow
to raise prots even though rms compete in two-part taris on their home market.
In the roaming market, directly competing operators of one country cannot soften
competition simultaneously as they need access to foreign infrastructure. Therefore, if
one operator enters into an international alliance and agrees on high wholesale roaming
prices, the competitor's perceived costs for roaming services remain unchanged.

In

contrast to Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), our line of reasoning relies on strategic
complementarity of retail taris: If one operator commits to higher wholesale prices, it
optimally oers less favorable contracts to subscribers. The domestic competitor reacts
by oering also less attractive taris and due to softer competition, both operators'
prots increase.

This might explain why domestic competitors did rarely complain

when international alliances were formed.
There are also conceptual similarities to the literature of vertical relationships.

11

In

particular, Shaer (1991) shows that downstream rms might prefer to pay higher unit
prices for intermediate goods and receive a xed compensation instead of low unit prices
if this serves as a commitment device to soften downstream competition. Similarly, in
our model, operators prefer to commit to high wholesale price to soften competition.
However, our reasoning does not rely on xed payments to compensate higher unit
prices since operators mutually provide roaming services in an alliance.
the existing literature has analyzed competition in

linear

In addition,

prices on the downstream

market so far. To our knowledge, we are the rst who show that operators may also
exploit strategic complementarity even though competing in

nonlinear

prices in the

downstream market.
Recently, a small literature that also analyzes the international roaming market

10 see e.g. Armstrong (2002) for an overview.
11 See e.g. Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Shaer (1991) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995).
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emerged.

Salsas and Koboldt (2004) as well as Lupi and Manenti (2006, 2008) also

consider a setup of two operators in each of two countries.

12

However, Salsas and

Koboldt (2004) do not explicitly take into account that each operator is active both on
the wholesale market and on the retail market and therefore do not consider the possibility of international alliances. Another dierence of their base setup to our model
is their assumption that roaming trac cannot be directed to a particular foreign network. They nd that if roaming trac is allocated randomly across foreign networks,
the resulting wholesale price even exceeds that of a monopolist.

13

Compared to Salsas

and Koboldt (2004), our contribution is to show that it may be advantageous to reciprocally commit to direct roaming trac to a partner network. Lupi and Manenti (2006,
2008) assume that operators act as local monopolists on the retail market. Therefore,
they do not analyze operators' incentives to set high wholesale prices in order to soften
retail competition. In their setup, alliances optimally set wholesale prices at marginal
costs, which is not in line with the current evidence.

14

In contrast to Lupi and Manenti

(2008), in our model alliances arise endogenously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we formally
introduce our basic model where alliances are exogenously given. Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium retail taris for given wholesale prices.

In section 4 we show that

wholesale prices would be set equal to marginal costs in the absence of international
alliances.

Section 5 considers the case where all operators have formed competing

international alliances and shows that operators set ineciently high wholesale prices.
Section 6 extends our basic model by adding a rst stage in which alliances can be
formed. As a result two competing alliances may emerge endogenously in absence of
regulatory constraints.

In section 7 we formally derive that recent improvements in

the technology of network selection have augmented the role of international alliances.
Section 8 oers various extensions that mainly serve as robustness checks before we
conclude in section 9.

2 The Model
There are two countries
country.

{0, 1}.

Operator

xi

A

and

B

is active in

as well as two MNOs with index

home

country

x ∈ {A, B}

0

and

1

in each

and has position

i ∈

We assume that each operator's network covers only its home country. Every

operator participates in two related markets: Firstly, each operator competes with its

retail market for subscribers which live in the operator's
Secondly, in the wholesale market each operator oers roaming services

domestic competitor on the
home country.

to foreign operators and buys these services in order to resell them to own subscribers.
These wholesale agreements are thus established between two operators of dierent
nationality.

Cost structure:

Each of the four operators incurs the same marginal cost

c≥0

when a subscriber places a roaming call. This marginal cost includes origination, trans-

12 Tsyganok (2008) also analyzes international roaming.
13 In an extension, Salsas and Koboldt (2004) assume that trac can be (partially) directed to the
cheapest foreign operator and they nd that this assumption drives wholesale prices down.

14 Lupi and Manenti (2008) also analyze wholesale prices that arise in case operators may grant

loyalty discounts if all adressable trac is directed to the same visited network. They nd that loyalty
discounts may leed to high wholesale prices.
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fer and termination. For simplicity, we assume that all roaming calls are terminated at
some third party xed network so that we can abstract from trac generated by the
termination of roaming calls. In addition, operators have to incur monthly xed costs

CF

per subscriber, e.g. for billing.

Retail pricing structure:

We focus on outgoing roaming calls that subscribers

may place while traveling abroad and assume that it is the only service which MNOs
oer to their subscribers. In particular, we abstract from nationwide calls.

15

Operators

xi charges a usage price pxi ∈ R per roaming call from
abroad and a (monthly) xed fee Fxi ∈ R. When a consumer places q roaming calls,
she has to pay in total pxi q + Fxi .
oer a two-part tari: Operator

Retail demand structure:

dierentiated à la Hotelling.
the segment

i ∈ {0, 1}

[0, 1].

As in Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), networks are

In each country, consumers are uniformly located on

The operators are located at the two extremities and the index

also indicates their position. Each consumer may join at most one network.

Being connected to any network generates a xed surplus
generates a

gross surplus u(q).

q

Placing roaming calls

Consumers have quasilinear preferences in wealth such

that the (incremental) utility of a consumer with taste
places

v0 .16

l

who joins operator

xi

and

roaming calls is:

−
The term

1
− 2σ
|i − l|

1
|i − l| + u(q) − pxi q − Fxi + v0
2σ

expresses the loss of utility in case the joined network does

not correspond exactly to the consumers taste where

σ>0

parameterizes the degree

of taste dierentiation. A consumer that does not join either network receives utility
that is normalized to

0.

For technical convenience, we assume that joining a network

is suenciently attractive (i.e.
on the relevant range of prices.

v0

17

is high enough) so that all subscribers join a network
Preferences are the same in both countries. Note that

consumers care only about their domestic operator, not about which foreign operator
handles their roaming calls.

18

The optimal individual demand and the resulting consumers' value from roaming
calls are dened as follows:

q(p) ≡ arg max {u(q) − pq}
q

v(p) ≡ u(q(p)) − pq(p)
15 Further services such as nationwide calls could be included in the model at the cost of tractability.
Due to competition in two part taris, usage prices would be set equal to perceived marginal costs.
See also footnote 16 below.

16 While we use

v0

to assure that the market is covered, this term may represent the net surplus

generated by services other than roaming which we do not model explicitely.

17 This assumption is commonly made the literature of network interconnection. See e.g. Laont,

Rey, and Tirole (1998a,

p. 7) for further discussion.

18 The assumption that consumers do not care which foreign network provides the roaming services

can be justied in several ways. One plausible reasoning relies on a heterogenous coverage. While a
subscriber usually lives and works at a priori known places, she prefers to join a network that oers
good coverage at these focal points. However, when signing a mobile phone contract, a subscriber is
usually less aware of the foreign places where she will use roaming services.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper354
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Since subscribers have quasilinear preferences concerning wealth, the value function
0
satises the envelope condition v (p) = −q(p). We maintain the following

v : R → V 19

mild assumption throughout the paper:

20

Assumption 1 Per customer demand q(p) is non-negative, continuously dierentiable
and non-increasing on R: q(·) ∈ R+ , q 0 (·) ≤ 0. Subscribers have a strictly positive
demand for roaming services at the true marginal cost: q(c) > 0.
For future reference we dene the

net surplus

of a tari as

w(p, F ) ≡ v(p) − F

(1)

Economically, the net surplus indicates how much of the value

v(p)

created by placing

roaming calls retains with the subscriber.
If the dierence between the net surpluses oered by competing retail contracts in
1
), both operators achieve a strictly positive
country x is not too large ( |wxi − wxj | <
2σ
21
market share.
The market share nxi of operator i in country x is then:

nxi = n(wxi , wxj ) ≡

1
+ σ (wxi − wxj )
2

(2)

If instead operator i oers a contract that is far more attractive than its competitor's
1
tari (wxi ≥ wxj +
), then it corners the whole market.
2σ
As each operator's infrastructure only covers its home country,

Wholesale prices:

its subscribers have to be hosted by another operator while traveling abroad. We assume
that the home operator is able to determine on which network its subscribers register
once they are abroad, since roughly 80% of the roaming trac was indeed directed to
the desired foreign network by 2006. For each roaming call, the host operator bills the
wholesale price

ayj

to the subscriber's home operator.

22

So the host operator's prot

ayj − c.

on one roaming call is

International alliances:

Mobile operators may also form international alliances.

Within an alliance, the operators negotiate on a wholesale price at which they mutually
provide roaming services. Alliance members commit to direct their subscribers to the
partner network abroad. It will become clear that the appeal of alliances lies precisely in
the commitment that the subscribers are possibly not hosted by the cheapest operator

19 Dene

V ≡ {ṽ|∃p ∈ R

s.t.

ṽ = v(p)}

as the set of values that can be possibly achieved.

20 This assumption essentially imposes restrictions on

u(·).

We state this assumption directly on

q(·)

for notational convenience.

21 See e.g. Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a).
22 Under the rules of the GSM Association, when a roaming subscriber uses the services of a visited

network, the roaming subscriber's home network is responsible for payment of all charges incurred for
services used in accordance with the published

Inter-Operator-Taris

(IOT) of the visited network.

The introduction of the IOT in 1998 dissociated wholesale roaming prices from the standard retail taris
applied by the visited network. Thus, the competitive conditions prevailing on the retail market were
no longer reected on the wholesale market for international roaming. Prior to 1998, wholesale roaming
charges were calculated on the basis of the so-called

Normal Network Tari

(NNT) of a visited MNO.

The NNT was based on the standard user tari charged by MNOs at the retail level. In 1995 visited
MNOs started charging foreign MNOs a multiplier up to a maximum of 1.15 to the NNT. This cap was
supposed to reect subscription charges that would otherwise have not been reected in the wholesale

roaming charges for outgoing calls. See also http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/05/44&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en .
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0

A

nA0

pA0 , FA0

pA1 , FA1

A0
aA0

A1
aB0

aA0

aA1

B0

B

aB1
B1

pB0 , FB0

0

1

nA1

pB1 , FB1
nB0

nB1

1

Figure 1: Model Setup - Overview

abroad.

After a wholesale price has been negotiated, it becomes public knowledge.

This assumption reects that the wholesale prices, which are also called Inter-OperatorTaris, are published by the GSM Association.

Internatioal alliances can be formed

only between operators from dierent home countries.

23

Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the model. It shows the equilibrium conguration of two competing alliances.

In this gure, MNOs with the same index form

alliances. The dashed line illustrates the possibility to oer roaming services to foreign
operators that are outside of an alliance.

Timing:

The base model consists of the following stages:

1. Members of an alliance negotiate wholesale prices for roaming calls within the
alliance.
2. MNOs simultaneously set wholesale roaming prices for operators that are not
aliated with an alliance.
3. Operators set retail taris.
4. Consumers subscribe to their preferred network and place their calls.
The sequential structure allows MNOs to set their wholesale prices strategically.

It

reects that due to legal and practical reasons, wholesale prices can be changed less
easily than retail taris.

24

The model is solved by backward induction.

23 We suspect that domestic regulation agencies would prohibit alliances that would involve of more
than one MNO of a coutry.

Members of these alliances could then collude on their domestic retail

prices as well, thereby weakening competition.

24 In Europe, the Standard Terms for International Roaming Agreement (STIRA) issued by the GSM

Association provide guidelines how wholesale prices have to be set. They prescribe that wholesale prices
have a validity of at least six months.
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3 Retail taris and market share
In this section we take as given the choice of the foreign host operator which provides
its network for the visiting subscribers abroad and characterize the equilibrium retail
taris, market shares, and the operators' retail prots.

Perceived marginal costs of roaming services:
xi,

selling operator

which we denote as

ator. For example, if operator

B

Ai

which are provided by operator

are

cxi ,

The marginal cost of the re-

equal the wholesale price of its host oper-

oers to its subscribers roaming services in country

Bj

then the perceived marginal costs of operator

Ai

cAi = aBj .
Since we assume that both competing operators in one country set their prices si-

multaneously, the optimal retail tari maximizes each operator's retail prot for a given
tari of the domestic competitor. Per subscriber, an operator earns

Fxi − CF .

(pxi − cxi ) q(pxi ) +

The retail equilibrium tari can be more easily derived by solving for the

optimal retail per call price and the optimal net surplus
mal xed fee.

25

When charging the per call price

incurring the perceived marginal cost of

pxi ,

(pxi , wxi )

instead of the opti-

oering the net surplus

wxi

and

cxi , an operator earns the following retail prot

per customer

π R (pxi , wxi , cxi ) ≡ q(pxi )(pxi − cxi ) + v(pxi ) − wxi − CF
The retail prots

ΠR
xi

(3)

are dened as follows:

R
R
ΠR
xi = Π (pxi , wxi , wxj , cxi ) ≡ n(wxi , wxj )π (pxi , wxi , cxi )
Thus the retail prot (4) of operator

xi

(4)

depends only on the net surplus of its

competitor's tari, not on its competitor's retail per call price.
Since the per call price does not enter the market share, the usage price is chosen
solely as to maximize the per customer prot (3). The availability of two-part retail
taris renders it optimal to set the per call price equal to perceived marginal costs, that
∗
26
is pxi = cxi .
Intuitively, when the usage price equals the perceived marginal costs,
any dead-weight loss (from the viewpoint of the reselling operator) is avoided and the

q(pxi )(pxi − cxi ) + v(pxi ) ≤ v(cxi ).27 The dierence
v(cxi ) and the desired net surplus wxi is then transferred

surplus is maximized since

between

the maximal surplus

between

the subscriber and the operator via the implicitly determined xed fee without causing
any ineciencies. The maximal per customer retail prot is

π R∗ (wxi , cxi ) = v(cxi ) − wxi − CF

(5)

The optimal level of net surplus can be determined explicitely by use of the corresponding rst order condition as follows:

25 Since the xed fee depends linearly on the net surplus, it can be easily retrieved using the identity

Fxi = v(pxi ) − wxi .

26 This nding is by now well understood. See e.g. Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a); Armstrong

(2002). This claim is formally proved in Lemma 1. We oer a proof here mainly to keep our paper
self-contained.

27 If

0

q (cxi ) = 0,

then

p∗xi = cxi

is not a strict maximizer of

also attained by other per call prices.

π R (pxi , axi , cxi ),

and its maximum is

However, this does neither change retail prots nor the best

response of the retail competitor. As all retail per call prices that attain the maximum retail prots
are economically equivalent, we treat them as one equivalence class.
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w∗ (cxi , wxj ) =

1
1
[v(cxi ) + wxj − CF −
]
2
2σ

(6)

The following Lemma characterizes the retail equilibrium:

Lemma 1 A retail equilibrium always exists. If the dierence between perceived marginal
costs is not too big, namely |v(cx0 ) − v(cx1 )| ≤ 2σ3 , the retail equilibrium is uniquely
characterized by (7)-(9). If instead v(cxi ) − v(cxj ) > 2σ3 , then there exists a unique equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies 28 where operator xi serves the whole market
1
∗
∗
+ v(cxj ) − CF , while its competitor sets wxj
= v(cxj ) − CF .
and oers wxi
= 2σ
Proof.

3
|v(cxi ) − v(cxj )| < 2σ
. We rst show that (6) indeed maxR
0
∂Π
∗
imizes retail prots given wxj .
Since
(pxi , wxi , wxj , cxi ) = nxi q (pxi )(pxi − cxi ),
∂p
xi
Rp 0
ΠR (pxi , wxi , cxi ) − ΠR (cxi , wxi , cxi ) = nxi cxixi q (p)(p − cxi )dp ≤ 0 with strict inequalR
∗
ity whenever nxi > 0 and q(cxi ) 6= q(pxi ).
Thus pxi = cxi maximizes Πxi indeR
∂Π
∗
∗
(c , wxi , wxj
, cxi ) = 2σ (wxi
− wxi ) so that
pendently of wxi and wxj . We have
∂wxi  xi

R
∗
∗
R
∗
Π cxi , wxi , wxj , cxi > Π cxi , wxi , wxj , cxi .
Suppose that

Solving simultaneously the reaction functions (6) for both operators yields the equations below. Being a system of linear equations, the solution is unique. The condition
3
assures that the market share stays between zero and one.
|v(cxi ) − v(cxj )| < 2σ
3
is treated in appendix A.1.
The case |v(cxi ) − v(cxj )| ≥
2σ

1
1
2
v(cxi ) + v(cxj ) −
− CF
3
3
2σ
1 σ
n∗ (cxi , cxj ) =
+ [v(cxi ) − v(cxj )]
2 3
(n∗ (cxi , cxj ))2
R∗
Π (cxi , cxj ) =
σ
w∗ (cxi , cxj ) =

(7)
(8)

(9)

The previous characterization of the retail equilibrium oers two interesting insights. Firstly, equation (8) conrms the intuition that MNOs with a lower perceived
marginal cost than their domestic competitor will also achieve a bigger market share
in equilibrium.
plus

The equilibrium market share depends only on the dierence in sur-

v(cxi ) − v(cxj )

call prices.

that both operators generate on the retail level using optimal per

Since the optimal per customer prots increase in the market share, the

dierence in equilibrium net surplus

wxi − wxj

is only one third of the dierence in

surplus.
Secondly, equation (9) shows that the retail prots depend on the perceived marginal
costs only through the equilibrium share. If wholesale roaming prices of both competitors in one country are reduced such that the market share is left unchanged, then the

28 See Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) for a denition of the undominated Nash Equilibrium concept.
An undominated NE may not consist of strategies that are weakly dominated. A strategy is weakly
dominated if there exists another strategy that yields for any strategy of the remaining agents at least
the same payo as the dominated one, and yields a strictly higher payo for at least one strategy of
the remaining agents.
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retail prots also stay constant.

Any surplus gains are passed on to the customers.

Thus, concerning the retail prots, operators are indierent against a rise of both competitors' perceived marginal costs that leaves the market share unchanged. This prot
neutrality is reminiscent of results found by Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a).
However, an increase of the perceived marginal cost of operator
that of operator

xj

xi's

xed decreases operator

xi

29

while holding

market share and its retail prots.

2n∗
∂ΠR∗ (cxi , cxj )
= − xi q(cxi )
∂cxi
3
R∗
∗
∂Π (cxi , cxj )
2nxi
=
q(cxj )
∂cxj
3

(10)

(11)

By the envelope theorem, changes of the own retail tari which are caused by an increase
in the perceived per call cost have no marginal eects on retail prots. Consequently,
in case both operators have a strictly positive market share, an increase in the own
perceived marginal cost (10) aects the retail prot through two channels. Firstly, a
∗
higher per call cost directly decreases the retail prot by −nxi q(cxi ). However, the
loss from a higher perceived marginal cost is partially compensated by softer competition on the retail market. Competitor

xj

anticipates that operator

xi

passes a higher

wholesale price on to the customers and optimally decreases its own net surplus by
dwxj
= − 31 q(cxi ). This increases the retail prot of operator xi by 31 n∗xi q(cxi ). Taken
dcxi
together, the negative marginal eect of an increase in the perceived cost outweighs the
positive eect of softer competition. So each operator prefers to pay as low wholesale
prices as possible.
According to equation (11), operator
marginal cost of its domestic competitor

xj

xi
xj .

benets from an increase in the perceived
By (6), an increase in

cxj

to oer less attractive retail taris. This in turn increases operator

induces operator

xi's market share

and thereby leads to an increase in prots.
Lemma 1 also describes the theoretical possibility of a corner equilibrium if the
dierence in perceived per call costs is too big. As long as the competitor stays out of
the market, a marginal increase in own per call costs triggers no strategic eect of softer
competition.

So there remains solely the direct negative eect of a higher perceived

cost.

4 Wholesale prices without international alliances
In this section, which serves as a benchmark, we assume that operators compete in a
standard Bertrand way to serve as host operator. Operators cannot commit to channel
their roaming trac to a particular network.

xi oers (simultaneous with its domestic competitor xj ) to
act as host operator for subscribers of country y at the wholesale price axi . For simplicity
In stage 1 each operator

we assume that each operator then selects one foreign operator that subsequently serves
as host operator for roaming calls from abroad.

29 Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) analyze the eect of two-part taris in section 8. They also nd
that increase of perceived marginal costs that leaves the equilibrium market shares unchanged has no
eect on equilibrium retail prots. This result hinges on the fact that ∂n(wx )/∂wi is constant.
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yj
nyj q(axi )[axi − c]

In case the foreign operator
the latter earns

xi as host operator, from section (2),
yj . As shown
operator of country y to buy roaming

selects operator

from roaming subscribers of operator

in the previous section, it is optimal for any

services from the foreign operator which oers the lowest wholesale price.

30

Therefore

any operator optimally undercuts the oered wholesale prices of its domestic competitor
as long as the margin

axi − c

is strictly positive. By the usual Bertrand resonsing, any

operator oers roaming services at wholesale price

axi = c in equilibrium.

The following

conclusion summarizes the resulting equilibrium wholesale prices:

Lemma 2 If international alliances are not feasible, in equilibrium the wholesale price
equals the real cost of providing a roaming call c.
Proof.

In the text.

5 Wholesale prices under international alliances
In this section we take the following
ator

A0

collaborates with

precisely,

Ai

B0

and

bilateral

A1

cooperations as

is host operator for the subscribers of

tor for subscribers of

Ai.

exogenously

given: oper-

forms an international alliance with

Bi

and conversely

Bi

B1.

More

is host opera-

The most important characteristic of this alliance is that both

members commit to buy roaming services only from the foreign partner network, even
in case another foreign operator oers cheaper wholesale prices for roaming services.
We assume that members of an alliance set wholesale prices cooperatively to maximize joint prots.

For simplicity, we impose that both partners must agree on one

wholesale price that applies for roaming calls in both directions:

aAi = aBi ≡ ai .31

We

later consider richer sets of agreements in section 8.2.
The negotiated wholesale prices are public knowledge.

Hence the ensuing retail

equilibrium taris are as described in section 3, treating the own wholesale price as a
perceived marginal cost:

cxi = ai .

In particular, operators anticipate the strategic eect

on their domestic competitors' retail taris.

xi's overall prot comes from
country x and from selling roaming

Operator
home

reselling roaming calls to subscribers in its
services to operator

yi.

Due to reciprocal

wholesale prices, symmetric costs and demand across countries all members of one
∗
∗
∗
R∗
alliance receive equal market shares nAi = nBi ≡ ni and equal retail prots ΠAi =
R∗
ΠR∗
Bi ≡ Πi . Therefore, the total prots of alliance i's members are as follows:



Πi = Π(ai , aj ) ≡ n∗ (ai , aj ) π W (ai ) + π R∗ (ai , aj )

(12)

where

π W (ai ) ≡ q(ai )[ai − c]
is the per customer wholesale prot of operator

xi.

30 Note that in case each operator applies the optimal retail taris as determined in section (3) and
would oer subscribers to choose among foreign operators, then it would be also optimal for subscribers
to choose the cheapest foreign network.

31 Due to our symmetry assumptions, both members of an alliance have identical preferences on the

wholesale price

axi .

Assuming symmetric bargaining power, they would deliberately choose

even if they were allowed to set possibly diering wholesale prices
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The following Lemma establishes that cornered-market congurations cannot be an
equilibrium:

Lemma 3 In any equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies 32 both alliances have a
positive market share: n∗ (a∗i , a∗j ) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof.

See appendix.

We prove that any such equilibrium would entail wholesale prices not lower than
marginal costs. In addition, a corner equilibrium would necessarily involve one alliance
that sets high wholesale prices, therefore attracts no customers and consequently earns
zero prots. But then it would be a better strategy to match the competing alliance's
wholesale price, which guarantees positive retail and nonnegative wholesale prots.
Hence no alliance will ever set a wholesale price that leads to its exclusion from the
market.
Since in any equilibrium both operators will achieve a positive market share, we
focus on

interior

equilibria, i.e. on wholesale prices that lead to a shared retail market
3
) in the further presentation. Building on the results of sec(i.e.|v(a0 ) − v(a1 )| <
2σ
tion 3, the marginal prot generated by an increase in the wholesale price of an alliance
is:

∂Π
(ai , aj ) = q(ai )
∂ai





1
σ W
∗
− (ai ) ni − π (ai )
3
3

(13)

markup

−(p−c)q 0 (p)
33
is the
elasticity of per customer demand.
q(p)
If the retail equilibrium taris were not aected by a change of the wholesale price,
where

(p) ≡

an increase of the wholesale prot, that would be achieved by raising the wholesale
price would be completely oset by a reduction of the retail prot.
arise

indirect

However, there

eects because a change of the wholesale price also aects the retail

taris.
Once the wholesale price has been xed within an alliance, each member chooses
the tari that maximizes its retail prots, not taking into account the eects on the
wholesale prots that foreign members of the alliance earn by providing roaming services. In particular, by section 3, the wholesale price will be passed on to customers
directly. The indirect eect of a marginal increase in ai through the usage price on
0
34
the per customer wholesale prot is (ai − c) q (ai ).
In addition, the retail equilibrium
∗
net surplus wi depends on the value v(ai ) implied by the wholesale price. Therefore,

32 This renement is needed to rule out unplausible equilibria in case case demand is constant below

c. In this case, the following class of corner equilibria exists: a∗i satises π W (a∗i ) = v(c) − v(a∗i ) < − 10
σ ,
3
1
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗
∗
W
∗
a∗j satises v(a∗j ) < v(c) − 2σ
. Clearly, n (ai , aj ) = 1 and Π(ai , aj ) = v(ai ) −
2σ − v(aj ) + π (ai ) =
1
v(c) − 2σ
− v(a∗j ) > σ1 . In addition, any deviation of alliance j yields at most prots 0. In the
3
∗
deviation price is âj such that v(âj ) > v(ai ) −
2σ so that alliance j achieves a positive share, then
i
h
Π(âj , a∗i ) ≤ n∗ (âj , a∗i )

n∗ (âj ,a∗
i)
σ

+ π W (âj ) ≤ 0

since

i to use a weakly
aj ∈ (−∞, 0].

of equilibria is unplausible since it requires operator
operator

j

to use a weakly dominated strategy on

π W (âj ) < − 10
σ +

3
2σ

<

n∗ (âj ,a∗
i)
.
σ

This class

dominated strategy on

R

and

33 Note that the demand elasticity in markup terms is closely connected to the price elasticity of

demand which is dened as
In case of

c = 0,

η(p) ≡

−pq 0 (p)
q(p) . The following relationship holds:

(p) = η(p) (p−c)
< η(p).
p

the markup elasticity coincides with the price elasticity of per customer demand.

34 Similar to section 3, while the envelope theorem states that an increase in the retail per call price

has no marginal eect on retail prots, it has a negative eect on wholesale prots.
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slightly increasing the wholesale price reduces the equilibrium retail market share by
dn∗
dn∗i
= − 13 σq(ai ) and thereby aects the wholesale prot by daii π W (ai ).
dai
There is also a
eect since the domestic competitor in the retail market

strategic

observes the negotiated wholesale prices. It reacts on higher wholesale prices by oering
itself less attractive taris as explained in section 3. Inducing softer competition renders
increasing wholesale prices attractive from the viewpoint of an alliance. The marginal
1
R∗
prot due to softer competition is σq(ai )πi .
3
The following mild technical assumption suces to guarantee existence and uniqueness:

Assumption 2 The markup elasticity of per customer demand (p) is non-decreasing
for all prices above marginal costs whenever (p) ≤ 1.
Assumption 2 is satised by many commonly used demand functions, including
constant demand, linear demand or constant (price) elasticity demand.

35

Analyzing the marginal prot (13) allows to restrict the relevant range of candidate
equilibrium wholesale prices as follows:

Lemma 4 In any interior equilibrium, the wholesale price a∗i
i) never lies below the marginal costs: a∗i ≥ c,
ii) is low enough to ensure positive per customer demand: q(a∗i ) > 0,
iii) ensures that the per customer demand markup-elasticity is low: (a∗i ) < 13 ,
iv) is low enough to satisfy v(c) < v(a∗i ) + 2σ3 if Assumption 2 holds.
Proof.

See appendix.

Lemma 4 summarizes some intuitive and economically important insights. The rst
part states that in any equilibrium an alliance will never set wholesale prices below
the marginal cost for two reasons: Firstly, a low wholesale price fuels competition on
the retail market. Secondly, wholesale prices below costs induce subscribers to place
calls ineciently often and losses on the wholesale level are even aggravated by an
ineciently high market share.

Thus, setting the wholesale price equal to marginal

cost clearly dominates prices below marginal costs.
Part ii) states that alliances never set the wholesale price so high that roaming
demand is completely choked o.

Given that the rival alliance charges a wholesale

price that covers at least its marginal costs, by setting the own wholesale price equal to
marginal costs, an alliance could increase its retail prots while maintaining a wholesale
prot of zero.
Part iii) of Lemma 4 states that alliances always operate at wholesale prices where
demand is quite inelastic with respect to the markup. Equation (13) directly reveals
1
that if (ai ) > , the adverse eect of increasing the dead-weight loss would dominate
3
36
the gains from softer competition.

35 Examples are constant demand
or demand of the form

q(p) = q ∀p, constant elasticity
q(p) = max {a − bpγ , 0} with a, b, γ > 0 .

demand

q(p) = ap−γ

a, γ > 0,

36 It is interesting to compare this insight with standard results from one-stage models of oligopolistic

consumer choice models where rms compete in linear prices such as Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov
(1995). In their model, rms set prices such that

(ai ) < 1,

hence potentially operate in slightly more

elastic regions. This comes from the fact, that in their model, an increase in the price really increases
the markup, while in our model it only leads to gains via softening the competition.
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The most surprising result of Lemma 4 is its last part.

It is never optimal to

v(ai ), compared to
costs, v(c). Intuitively,

choose a wholesale price that would excessively reduce the value
that generated by a usage price that equals the true marginal

setting a high wholesale price means that the wholesale prots per customer are high.
But then it would be more protable to marginally decrease the wholesale price in order
to expand the market share. This result has an important implication for equilibrium
existence:

As the equilibrium prices are not too far away from the marginal costs,

deviating from any equilibrium by setting the wholesale price equal to marginal costs
does not suce to corner the market. Deviations that allow to corner the market thus
require prices below the true marginal costs and are therefore less attractive than smaller
deviations. Thus, in contrast to Laont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), local equilibria are
always robust to big deviations if Assumption 2 holds.
For future reference, we dene

E

as the relevant set of wholesale prices that poten-

tially might be chosen in equilibrium according to Lemma 4.
customer demand guarantee that

E

is an interval nonempty

37

38

Assumptions 1 and 2 on
with lowest element

c.

Setting marginal prots (13) to zero and rearranging, we obtain the Lerner condition

1
a∗i − c
=
∗
∗
ai
3 [ηq (ai ) + ηn∗ (a∗i )]
0

(14)

price

q (ai )
ηq (ai ) ≡ − aiq(a
i)

is the
elasticity of per customer demand and ηn∗ (ai ) ≡
dn∗i ai
− dai n∗ is the price elasticity of the equilibrium retail market share. In a symmetric
i
1
∗
equilibrium, each alliance achieves a market share of ni =
and the price elasticity of
2
2
the market share simplies to ηn (ai ) ≡ σai q(ai ). We now state our main result:
3
where

Proposition 5 The wholesale prices of any interior equilibrium are characterized by
equation (14) and are strictly above marginal costs: a∗i > c. If Assumption 2 holds,
then a symmetric equilibrium exists with both alliances setting the wholesale price a∗0 =
a∗1 = a∗ . This unique interior equilibrium entails an equilibrium per customer wholesale
∗)
prot of π W ∗ = 1−3(a
.
2σ
Proof.

See the appendix.

Besides existence and uniqueness, proposition 5 conrms that alliances will set
higher wholesale prices for roaming calls than would be socially optimal. Assumption 2
assures existence and uniqueness but is not needed to derive that a strictly positive
markup on the wholesale level necessarily occurs.
The intuition of this proposition is as follows:

By setting high wholesale prices,

operators credibly commit to oer less attractive retail taris and thereby soften competition on the retail price setting stage. Accepting a high unilateral wholesale price
for own customers would not be protable as shown in section 4.
high wholesale prices bilaterally in an alliance

is

However, setting

attractive: Within an international

alliance, each operator acts as host operator and fully benets from high wholesale
prices by providing roaming calls for the foreign operator's subscribers. After wholesale

37 Formally,


E = p ∈ R|(p) <

1
3

∧ p ≥ c ∧ q(p) > 0 ∧ v(p) > v(c) −

3
2σ

38 Since we assume that the per customer demand is continuously dierentiable on

bounded around
close to

c

and that

q(c) > 0,

the markup elasticity

(p)

R

and therefore

approaches zero for wholesale prices

c.
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prices have been set in an alliance, an operator cannot aect the retail market share of
members in the foreign country any more. Hence wholesale prots will not aect the
decision of the own retail tari for domestic subscribers.

However, being committed

to pay high wholesale prices when buying roaming services for own subscribers softens
competition on the home retail market.
Looking at the marginal eects of an increase in wholesale prices when they are
close to marginal costs is helpful to understand why there is always a positive wholesale
∂Πi
(c, aj ) = 31 n∗i q(c) > 0 and
markup in equilibrium. Evaluating (13) at ai = c, yields
∂ai
illustrates that there is a positive rst-order eect on the joint prot of an alliance

.

In contrast, losses caused by the operators from not taking into account the wholesale
prots when setting retail prices are of second-order at

ai = c .

The reason is that when

the wholesale markup is small, so is the indirect marginal eect on the wholesale prot.
Thus, taking the wholesale prot not into account when setting retail prices leads only
to a minor distortion for small wholesale margins. Taken together, for wholesale prices
close to marginal costs, the positive eect from softening competition dominates. Hence
it is always better to set the wholesale price slightly above the true marginal cost, until
the marginal eects are equalized.
The role of wholesale prices diers from that of access-prices in Laont, Rey, and
Tirole (1998a). In their model of network interconnection, the level of the access price
does not inuence the market share since it equally applies to both domestic competitors. Therefore, even the industry monopoly prots can be attained provided the retail

aj as given and increasing the bilateral wholei decreases its market share. The danger of losing too much market

equilibrium exists. In our model, taking
sale price of alliance

share keeps wholesale prices below the level that maximizes industry prots.
The next proposition summarizes some comparative statics:

Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
i) The equilibrium wholesale price a∗ is decreasing in the degree of competition on the
retail market σ .
ii) Suppose that the per customer demand function q̃ is more elastic than q : ηq̃ (p) >
ηq (p) ∀p ∈ E . Denote the corresponding equilibrium wholesale prices by ã∗ and a∗ .
If the per customer demand q̃ is weakly higher than q at the equilibrium price a∗ (i.e.
q̃(a∗ ) ≥ q(a∗ )), then ã∗ < a∗ .
Proof.

See appendix.

Proposition 6 conrms that the comparative statics are as expected. Part i) states
that an increase in the degree of retail competition reduces the wholesale equilibrium
prices. If the taste dierences of customers are small, then the negative eect of losing
market share when increasing the wholesale price is strong relative to the competition
softening eect. Hence alliances nd it optimal to set a small wholesale markup.
Part ii) compares dierences in the elasticity of demand.

When demand is more

elastic, then the dead-weight loss invoked by setting the wholesale price above marginal
costs becomes more pronounced.

39

In addition, the marginal gains from reduced com-

39 Proposition 6, part ii) also requires that the more elastic demand function

q̃ generates higher
q̃(a∗ ) ≥ q(a∗ ). Together with the requirement of
q̃(a) ≥ q(a) ∀a < a∗ . This additional requirement is needed to avoid

demand for the old equilibrium wholesale price:
higher elasticity this implies that

counter-intuitive eects that arise from softer competition.
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petition which are proportional to demand, diminish quicker as prices are increased.
Taken together, more elastic demand serves to discipline alliances.

Examples.

The results of this section can be illustrated by some common de-

mand functions that admit explicit solutions. First, we assume that the per customer
is constant: q(p) = q̄ . The elasticity of the retail market share becomes
σai
ηn (ai ) = 3n∗ q̄ and the equilibrium wholesale price can be determined explicitly by solvi
1
∗
ing condition (14): aq̄ = c +
. This formula conrms that the equilibrium price is
2σ q̄
decreasing in the degree of competition σ .
demand

q

Another example that admits an explicit solution is the commonly used constant
A
elasticity demand q̃(p) =
. Using this specication, the equilibrium wholesale price is
p

1
c
∗
∗
then q̃(aq̄ ) ≥ q̄ and the hypothesis of proposition 6,
aq̃ = c + 2+2σA . If A ≥ cq̄ + 2σ

1
c
∗
part ii) is satised. Indeed, for A = cq̄ +
, we get aq̃ = c +
< a∗q̄ .
2σ
3+2σ q̄c
It remains to assess the eects of alliances. Like in section 4 every operator achieves a
1
R
market share of
in the domestic retail market. Since the retail equilibrium prot Πi =
2
2
(n∗i )
depends only on the market share but not on the absolute level of retail prices, it
σ
is equally high with and without alliances. However, compared to section 4, operators
additionally earn a strictly positive wholesale margin which makes them better of in
total.
Subscribers are unambiguously worse o once alliances have formed because of two
reasons: First, the overall surplus generated by roaming calls decreases when retail per
call prices are above true marginal costs. In addition, by the preceding paragraph, in
equilibrium alliances earn higher prots and hence a smaller part of the surplus (which
is smaller compared to section 4) is retained with the subscribers.
Note that strategic eects could not be achieved if operators
instead of forming an alliance. A merged operator

i

Ai

and

Bi

merged

would possess a network in both

coutries. It would therefore set the retail prices in each coutry as to maximize the sum
of wholesale and retail prots of both countries.

ai 6= c within

Setting a (virtual) wholesale price

a merged international operator would be meaningless, as the retail tari

in each country is set to maximize the joint prot generated in both countries.

The

joint equilibrium prot of a merged operator that competes against one alliance can
R∗
be written as 2Π (c, aj ). It is easy to conrm that the industry prot that obtains if
there are two merged operators

i

and

j

equals the industry prot in case alliances are

unfeasible.

Policy Intervention:

We now analyze the eects of imposing a price cap. In 2007,

the European Commission introduced a price cap both at the retail and the wholesale
level. Prior to this decision, there was a debate whether a single regulatory intervention
in one of these markets might be sucient. In our model, imposing a binding price cap
above the true marginal cost solely at the

wholesale level

clearly increases both welfare

and consumer surplus but reduces industry prots. However, it turns out that
restricting the

retail usage

solely

price is likely to have a detrimental eect on consumer

welfare.
To see this, consider the eects of a xed retail price cap
eects as a higher level of
for some constant

A

σ.

p.

Remember that each

we could have normalized

q̂(p) = Aq(p)
σ̂ = Aσ . In principle

This can be seen analyzing condition (32) and considering

which yields the same equilibrium condition as considering

σ̂ ≡ 1

and set

q̂(p) ≡

1
σ q(p) but for expositional reasons we have not done

so.
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operator optimally sets the retail usage price
generated. If the wholesale price

pi

as to maximize the surplus which is

ai

exceeds the price cap, then the optimal choice is
∗
to set the usage price as high as possible, namely pi = p. The maximized surplus
generated on the retail stage when respecting the price cap p is therefore:

(
v(p) + q(p) (p − ai )
v(ai ) ≡
v(ai )
Clearly, restricting the usage price to lie below
retail level whenever

ai > p

p

if
if

ai > p
ai ≤ p

(15)

reduces the surplus created at the

and the demand is decreasing at

p.

Remember that all results concerning the retail equilibrium depend on the wholesale
prices only through the surplus which is created at the retail level.
extend to the case when a price cap is in place if we replace

Therefore, they

v(ai ) by the function v(ai ).

In particular, if the wholesale prices of the competing alliances are close enough, namely
3
, then both operators achieve a positive market share determined by
|v(a0 ) − v(a1 )| < 2σ
1
σ
∗
n (ai , aj ) = 2 + 3 [v(ai )−v(aj )] which parallels equation (8). In this case the equilibrium
∗
level of net surplus w i conceded to consumers reads as follows:

2
1
1
w∗i = v(ai ) + v(aj ) − CF −
3
3
2σ

(16)

R∗
Since the equilibrium per customer retail prot is πi
= v(ai ) − w∗i − CF , in case of
1
R∗
= 2σ , which is the same as in section 3.
symmetric wholesale prices operators earn πi
Thus we can determine the eect of a price cap for given symmetric wholesale prices
as follows:

Lemma 7 Suppose that both alliances set wholesale price a in case of no intervention
and wholesale price a after a price cap p has been introduced. Denote the resulting
retail equilibrium net surplus by w∗ (a) and w∗ (a). The dierence in consumer surplus
between both regimes equals the dierence of surplus that is generated on the retail level:
w∗ (a) − w∗ (a) = v(a) − v(a).
In particular, if the wholesale price is exogenously xed at a, (i.e. a = a) and the
0
consumer demand is decreasing at a (i.e. q (a) < 0), then introducing a binding price
cap p < a reduces the consumer surplus.
Proof.

By the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, in case of symmetric

wholesale prices the rst order conditions are sucient for retail prot maximization.
Solving the system of rst order conditions yields (16). Comparing equation (7) with

ai = aj = a and (16) with ai = aj = a yields the result.
0
If a = a, q (a) < 0 and p < a, then v(a) > v(a) = v(a)

so that

w∗ (a) > w∗ (a)

by

the rst part of the Lemma.
The last part of the previous Lemma implies that even if a regulator could impose a
cap on the usage retail prices

and

x the wholesale prices, the consumer surplus would

be generally reduced.
However, imposing a price cap on the retail level also inuences the equilibrium
wholesale prices. For wholesale prices above p and for an interior conguration ( 0
n∗i < 1), the total marginal prots of an operator are:
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∗

∂Π
q(p) ∗
(ai , aj ) =
[ni − σq(p)(ai − c)]
∂ai
3
Let us denote the wholesale per customer prot in case of a binding cap by

πW
≡
i

q(p)(ai − c).

Independently of the customer demand function, the requirement that in
1
W∗
any symmetric equilibrium marginal prots are zero yields π
. Comparing to
= 2σ
∗
1−3(a )
W∗
the unrestricted equilibrium prots π
= 2σ derived in Proposition 5 reveals that
the per customer prot unambigously increases after the introduction of a cap.
In the proof of the next Proposition we conrm that even if the price cap is set
in the most ecient way, namely

p = c,

the eciency gains from lower usage prices

fall short of the dierence in equilibrium wholesale prots.

Therefore, introducing a

binding price cap tends to lower consumer surplus:

Proposition 8 Denote by a∗ the equilibrium wholesale price according to proposition
5.
0
Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that demand is decreasing at a∗ : q (a∗ ) < 0.
Then introducing a retail per call price cap p ≤ a∗ decreases consumer surplus and
increases industry prots. If p < a∗ and the price cap is not set below the true marginal
cost it increases total welfare. If the price cap is suciently
close to the unrestricted
3(a∗ )
∗
equilibrium wholesale price (i.e. q(p) − q(a ) < 2σ(a∗ −c) ) then the equilibrium wholesale
price increases.
Proof.

See appendix.

If the mild conditions of Proposition 8 are satised, restricting the retail per call
price increases total welfare. Since the market is always covered, the retail per call price
uniquely determines total welfare. By hypothesis, the retail price cap reduces this price
and therefore increases total welfare as long as it does not undercut the true marginal
cost.
Two counterveiling eects determine how a price cap inuences the wholesale equilibrium price. A retail price cap prevents operators from passing through high wholesale
prices to the subscribers. Therefore, increasing the wholesale price does not aggravate
the dead-weight loss, which renders higher wholesale prices more attractive.

On the

other hand, the cap on the retail price guarantees that each subscriber places at least

q(p)

calls.

This increases the wholesale prots per customer and renders subscribers

more valueable, thereby inducing alliances to set lower wholesale prices. Whenever the
3(a∗ )
∗
condition q(p) − q(a ) <
holds, the rst eect dominates and higher wholesale
2σ(a∗ −c)
∗
prices obtain. Note that for (a ) > 0, by continuity of q , a price cap which is set close
∗
enough to a satises this condition and thus increases the wholesale price.
Our results suggest that in order to protect subscribers, price caps should preferrably be imposed on the wholesale level. This might explain why national regulation
authorities that can usually only intervene on the retail level have mostly chosen not
to regulate roaming prices prior to the intervention of the European Commission.
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6 Endogenous formation of alliances
We now endogenize the choice of MNOs to form alliances. Alliances may not be formed
of MNOs within the same country, for example due to legal constraints.
any alliance consists of exactly one MNO with home country
country

B.

40

Therefore

A and another with home

As before, joining an alliance means committing to buy roaming services

from the foreign alliance member at the negotiated mutual wholesale price, even though
another foreign operator may oer lower prices.
Formally, we introduce a formation stage that takes place before wholesale prices
are set.

In this stage any operator may either announce that it is willing to join an

alliance or remain silent. In order to circumvent coordination failures, we assume that
rst both operators in country

A

declare their intentions.

41

The MNOs of country

B

observe these declarations before announcing themselves their disposition to engage in
an alliance.

Due to our symmetry assumptions, operators are indierent with which

of the two foreign operators to form an alliance. Therefore we assume without loss of
generality that if all operators announce to join an alliance, operators with the same

x are interested in
y , then one of the two operators

position in the retail market are matched. If two operators in country
forming an alliance, while only one operator in country
in country

x

is randomly chosen to participate in the alliance. However, the process

how alliances are formed plays only a minor role as long after the formation of alliances
all members retain equal bargaining power and symmetric preferences concerning the
wholesale price.
Our main line of reasoning does not hinge on foreclosure. Therefore we assume that
joining an alliance does not preclude any MNO from selling roaming services to foreign
operators that do not pertain to this alliance.

42

More precisely, after having possibly

joined an alliance and negotiated on internal wholesale prices
a wholesale price

ãxi

ai ,

every MNO may post

that applies to foreign operators that have not joined the same

alliance. Thus, even if one alliance has been forged, there remains competition to act
as host operator.
By a similar Bertrand reasoning as in section 4, operators that have not joined an
alliance will buy roaming services at a wholesale price equal to true marginal costs

xi and yi have formed an alliance and xed
xj and yj remain without alliance. The retail prots

in equilibrium. Intuitively, suppose that
wholesale price
of operator

xi

ai

while operators

are unaected by the wholesale price that it charges to deliver roaming

services outside the alliance, since it is obliged to buy roaming services at price

xj

and the retail pricing decision of operator
This renders it protable for operator

xi

to undercut its competitor's wholesale price

40 Suppose all operators could jointly x the wholesale prices of all roaming calls
prots (for example by a multilateral agreement).

a to maximize joint

Then, under the assumption that the market is

always fully covered, all operators would agree on a wholesale price that to maximizes joint
prots, i.e. that is dened by the Lerner formula:

ai

is independent of its wholesale prots.

a∗ −c
a∗

=

1
η(a∗ ) .

wholesale

41 The equilibirum that we characterize in this section is also an equilibrium if all operators announce
simulateous whether they want to participate in an alliance. The simulaneous setup yields additionally
other equilibria, with one or zero alliances being formed. However, both of these alternative equilibria
lead to lower prots and therefore operators would coordinate on the more protable equilibrium with
two alliances if possible.

42 In addition, domestic regualtion authorities might prohibit alliances that force members not to

sell to outsiders as this behavior might be perceived illegal.
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whenever

ãxj > c: When
yi that

only to operator

xi will
n (ai , ãxj ).

not undercutting, then operator
∗

achieves a market share of

sell roaming services
By undercutting

ãxj

yj and hence the retail market shares
xi then additionally earns strictly positive wholesale
prots from selling to yj . Since operator xj sells on the wholesale market at most to the
foreign operator yj , it clearly undercuts xi for any ãxi > c. Hence in any equilibrium,
ãxi = ãxj = c. Taken together, MNOs that do not join an alliance anticipate being
slightly, the perceived marginal cost of operator
stay almost constant. But operator

oered roaming services at the true marginal cost but earning zero wholesale prots.
Forming an alliance has two eects: First, members of alliance

i may coordinate on a

wholesale price that possibly diers from the true marginal costs. Second, if competing
operators

a∗i

j

have also formed an alliance, they anticipate the equilibrium wholesale price
a∗ (aj ) denote the wholesale price that

and set their wholesale price accordingly. Let

an alliance sets to maximize its prot, if it expects its competing operators in both
countries to purchase roaming services at wholesale price

aj .

The following Lemma

establishes that optimal wholesale prices are complements on the relevant range

E:

Lemma 9 Suppose that assumption 2 holds.
i) For any aj ∈ E there exists a unique a∗ (aj ) ∈ E that strictly maximizes Π(ai , aj ) in
R.
ii) For any aj ∈ E , the prot maximizing wholesale price a∗ (aj ) is strictly increasing in
aj .
iii) If competing operators purchase roaming services at marginal costs c, the optimal
wholesale price within an alliance lies above: a∗ (c) > c.
Proof.

See appendix.

The preceeding Lemma implies that each operator prefers creating an additional
alliance to staying alone.
alliance

43

If operators

j

do not form an alliance, then members of

i

anticipate that non-members will procure roaming services at marginal costs
∗
and therefore set the wholesale price ai = a (c). By Lemma 9, it is still attractive to
∗
44
form an alliance since Π(a (c), c) > Π(c, c).
If operators j enter an alliance, then
∗ ∗
∗
∗
Π(a , a ) > Π(c, a ) > Π(c, a (c)) where the rst inequality comes from Lemma 9 and
the second reects that the total prot is increasing in the competitors' prices.
operators

i

prefer to form a second alliance instead of staying alone.

45

Hence

In both cases,

creating an aditional alliance allows its members to commit to higher wholesale prices
than true marginal costs. Higher own prices induce competitors raise their wholesale
prices if possible which aditionally increases own prots.
The following proposition conrms that two alliances emerge in the unique equilibrium:

Proposition 10 Suppose that assumption 2 holds. Then a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists with two competing alliances being formed. In every country, the market
43 Note however, that announcing to form an alliance is not dominant for operators in country
Whenever only one MNO in country

A announced to form an alliance,

payo as long as the domestic competitor forms an alliance.

B.

remaining silent yields a higher

This might also explain why domestic

competitors have not complained against the formation of international alliances.

44 We use the notation of section 5.

45 Formally, ∂Π (a , a ) = 1 q(a ) 2n∗
∂aj

i

j

3

j

i


+ σπ W (ai )

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

21

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 354 [2009]

is equally split between both alliances. Both alliances set the equilibrium wholesale price
characterized by Proposition 5.

Proof.

See appendix.

Proposition 10 is based on the following intuition: If the announcement of any oper-

Bi aects the total number of alliances that are created, given the announcements
of operators in country A and of the competitor Bj , then Bi optimally declares to form
another alliance. Hence in any equilibrium as many MNOs in country B announce
to form an alliance as have already done so in country A. But this implies that any
operator in country A can increase the number of alliances by announcing to form an
ator

alliance. By the preceeding paragraph creating additional alliances increases an operator's prot so that both operators in country

A

announce to form an alliance in the

unique equilibrium.

7 The role of host network selection
This section serves to analyze the competitive impact of recent technological developments that have improved the home operators' control over the choice of foreign host
networks for roaming.

46

As mentioned in the introduction, by 2006 roughly 80% of the

European roaming trac was already actively directed to preferred networks abroad.
In this section we derive that the possibility of trac direction increases the competitive pressure in the wholesale market. In addition, we point out why the importance of
international alliances has increased in light of these technological developments. While
alliances are welfare reducing when the host network can be selected suciently well,
they are without bite if the host network is randomly determined.
We consider here the polar case of operators having no control on which foreign
network their subscribers log in.

Comparing the outcome to the results of the base

model with perfect control allows to understand how the technology of network selection
aects decisions on the pricing and the formation of alliances. For sake of completeness,
appendix B extends the results of this section to intermediate levels of imperfect control.
We assume that operators cannot discriminate the per call price on the retail market
contingent on which foreign network is used. If price discrimination was feasible and
subscribers could actively choose their host network abroad, they would always choose
the cheapest network. Hence their home operator could perfectly control the network
selection by setting the price of the preferred foreign network lower than that of the
not-desired network. The outcome would then be economically equivalent to our base
model.
When buying roaming calls from foreign MNOs on the wholesale market, operator

xi's

perceived marginal cost is:

cxi =

1
(ay0 + ay1 )
2

(17)

Since operators cannot discriminate the retail prices according to which host network
provides the roaming services, the per call price equals the perceived marginal cost:

46 Salsas and Koboldt (2004) oer a more extensive treatment of recent technological developments.
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p∗xi = cxi .

The equilibrium net surplus, market share and the retail equilibrium prots

remain as established in Lemma 1.
We now turn to the wholesale market.

No international alliances.
of operator

xi(where

In absence of alliances the total wholesale demand

the superscript

A
QN
xi

NA

=Q

NA

means no alliance) is:

1
(axi , axj ) ≡ q
2




1
(ax0 + ax1 )
2

The demand does not depend on the actual market share of the reselling operators,
since for all price combinations, both foreign operators purchase half of their trac at
operator

xi.

The overall prot of operator

xi

is:

A
NA
ΠN
(axi , axj ) ≡ ΠR∗ (cxi , cxj ) + (axi − c) QN A (axi , axj )
xi = Π

(18)

Similar to section 4, in equilibrium each operator takes the foreign wholesale prices
and therefore its retail prots as given. Therefore operator xi sets its wholesale price in
NA
order to maximize its wholesale prots (axi − c) Q
(axi , axj ). We make the following
mild technical assumption in order to state our rst result:

Assumption 3 The markup elasticity of per customer demand (p) is increasing for
all prices above marginal costs whenever q(p) > 0 and there exists some p̃ > c with
(p̃) = 2.
Lemma 11 Suppose that assumption 3 holds. If operators cannot select the host networks, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with wholesale price aN A∗ , characterized by
2
aN A∗ − c
=
N
A∗
a
ηq (aN A∗ )

(19)

where ηq (·) is the price elasticity of per customer demand.

Proof.

The wholesale price axi does not inuence operator xi's retail prots. Hence,

1
1
(a
−
c)
q
(a
+
a
)
. Rearranging the resulting rst
xi
xi
xj
2
2
order condition yields condition (19). Rewriting the marginal prot in terms of markup

∂ΠN A
elasticity and evaluating at axj = axi yields
= 21 q (axi ) 1 − 21  (axi ) . Thus the
∂axi
rst order condition is satised at p̃ which exists and is unique by Assumption_(3).
0
The prot is strictly quasiconcave since  (p) > 0 whenever q(p) > 0 by assumption.

axi

is chosen to maximize

By Lemma 11, if operators cannot inuence which foreign network subscribers use
to place roaming calls, the resulting equilibrium wholesale price is extremely high.
Unilaterally increasing the wholesale price

xi causes a negative externality on the rival,

xj

is reduced while only the margin of operator

since the wholesale demand of operator

xi

increases.

As operators do not take this externality into account, the resulting

equilibrium price even exceeds the monopoly price.

Two international alliances.

Similar to section 5, we now analyze the equilibrium

outcome after operators with same location have formed two competing alliances. We
omit the country index for brevity.
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We restrict operators to sell roaming calls on the wholesale market to all foreign
operators for the same price

ai

that is negotiated within an alliance.

47

Otherwise,

we maintain all assumptions of the base model but assume that alliance members
cannot commit to direct their subscribers to the partner network.

Thus, the only

virtue of alliances that remains is to set the wholesale price cooperatively instead of
competitively.

ai and aj , the equilibrium wholeQi = Q(ai , aj ) ≡ 21 q 12 (a0 + a1 ) . The

If both alliances have negotiated wholesale prices
sale demand for roaming calls of operator
prots of each operator in alliance

i

i

is

are:

1
Πi = Π(ai , aj ) ≡ Π (ci , cj ) + (ai − c) q
2
R∗



1
(a0 + a1 )
2


(20)

Comparing equations (20) and (18) immediately reveals that the same prots obtain
for equal wholesale prices. Thus the following Lemma conrms that we should expect
the same equilibrium prices:

Lemma 12 Suppose that assumption 3 holds and operators cannot select the host network of their subscribers. The formation of two alliances does not aect the wholesale
equilibrium price, that remains characterized by (19). Ceterus paribus, the equilibrium
wholesale price under random selection of the host network lies above that of perfect
network selection given by Proposition 5.
Proof.

The proof of existence and uniqueness parallels that of Lemma (11), since the

same objective function is maximized. For proposition 18 of appendix B we prove that
the equilibrium price decreases with the quality of network selection. In particular, the
equilibrium wholesale price under no control exceeds that of perfect control.
Intuitively, there are two reasons why equilibrium prices are higher if the host network is selected randomly.

Firstly, compared to the base model, an alliance's retail

market share is insensitive to increases of the wholesale price. This is because the perceived marginal costs

ci

of operators within alliance

ai .

both depend equally on the own wholesale price
roaming trac, members of alliance
roaming calls from alliance

i.

j

i

and those of the rival alliance

j

Secondly, without control of the

that have to procure half of their subscribers'

Therefore, raising the wholesale price

ai

may increase the

wholesale prot generated from sales to operators of the competing alliance.
The insight that the presence of alliances does not aect the wholesale prices without network control is at rst glance surprising.

One might be tempted to conject

that alliances mitigate the problem of double marginalization as in Carter and Wright

47 Even though this restriction might seem very restrictive at rst glance, it allows to better compare
the results with those of the base model. When allowing MNOs to discriminate between members of
the alliance and non-members, then the wholesale price

ãi

that applies to non-members will be set

extremely high and in many cases there is no equilibrium. Intuitively, as foreign operator
in alliance

i

has to half of its roaming calls from operator

marginal costs of operator

j

i,

setting a high

ãi

and therefore increases the retail market share of alliance
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(1994).

48

However, because competition on the retail market is in two part taris, dou-

ble marginalization is not an issue since no deadweight loss is caused on the retail level.
Since increasing the wholesale price unilaterally increases the perceived marginal costs
of both domestic competitors, it does not aect the retail prots. Therefore members
of an alliance cannot increase their prots by coordinating on a wholesale price that
diers from the individually optimal level. So there is no point in forming an alliance,
as with or without alliances the subscribers are divided evenly among the foreign networks. Compared to the base model, international alliances are unattractive without
the technology to direct subscribers to foreign partner networks. Our model therefore
provides an explanation why in Europe international roaming alliances were formed
mainly after a powerful network selection technologies have become available.

8 Extensions
The base model is constructed to point out our main result of potentially harmful
alliances while keeping our model tractable. We relax the assumption of homogenous
customers in section 8.1 in order to show that this generalization does not change
our main results qualitatively.

In section 8.2 we vary the admissible set of pricing

instruments.

8.1

Heterogeneous consumers

Our main result of this section is that heterogeneous consumers lead to unambiguously
lower prots in equilibrium. However, alliances still serve to raise equilibrium prots
since the equilibrium prots decrease only gradually in the degree of heterogeneity. As
in section 5 we assume that operators of both countries with same position in their home
market have formed alliances. As all results are valid for both countries, we omit the
country index for brevity of notation. In this section, we focus on candidate symmetric
equilibria that satisfy the necessary rst order conditions of prot maximization.

Retail demand structure.

of consumers indicated by

θk

In contrast to our main setup, there are two types

with

k ∈ {L, H}

and

θL < θH .49

We assume that the

consumer's type is observable by the MNOs but will discuss later the implications of
relaxing this assumption.

vk (p) ≡ θk v(p)

with

v(p)

A consumer of type

θk

values roaming calls according to

remaining dened as in section 2.

the utility that a subscriber of type

θk

Likewise,

obtains from consuming

q

qk (p) ≡ θk q(p).
β of

A proportion

denotes

50

Sub-

θk

subscriber is given

The measure of subscribers remains normalized to

1 in every country.

scribers still have quasilinear preferences so that the demand of an
by

uk (q)

roaming calls.

these are

light users

wise, the remaining fraction of

1−β

are

with type

θL

heavy users

and relatively low demand. Likecharacterized by

θH .

Without loss

48 In contrast to our model, they assume that there is a monopolist in each country and that the
monopolists set linear taris both on the wholesale and retail market.

They nd that if operators

cooperatively set wholesale prices to maximize their prots, then both consumer surplus and prots
exceed the uncooperative outcome. This result obtains as cooperation allows to circumvent the doublemarginalization problem.

49 In a model of network interconnection, Dessein (2003) uses a similar setup.
50 Note that due to our specication, u (q) 6= θ u(q) in general.
k
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θL < 1 < θH such that βθL +(1 − β) θH ≡ 1. This normalizaq(p) as the mean demand per consumer at per call prices p. All
consumers have the same degree of dierentiation σ and the location of the consumers is

of generality, we normalize
tion allows to interpret

stochastically independent from their type. For future reference, we dene the hetero2
2
geneity of consumers as the variance of their type: ρ ≡ β (θL − 1) + (1 − β) (θH − 1) .
If

ρ = 0,

we are back in the base model with homogeneous consumers.

Retail pricing structure.

i

sets the retail per call

Fki for a type θk subscriber. We equivalently express the
51
problem in terms of quantity qki ≡ qk (pki ) and net surplus wki ≡ uk (qki ) − qki pki − Fki .
As before, the xed component Fki can be easily recovered for any level of quantity and
price

pki

Similar to section 3, operator

and the xed fee

net surplus.

Wholesale pricing structure.

MNOs still charge a linear wholesale price to

foreign operators. MNOs cannot discriminate the wholesale prices according to which
type of customers the roaming calls are sold nally.

Retail prots.

The retail prots of operator

i

are now

R
R
ΠR
i = βnLi πLi + (1 − β) nHi πHi

(21)

R
πki
= πkR (wki , qki , cki ) ≡ uk (qki ) − wki − qki ci − CF being the per customer retail
1
+ σ(wki − wkj ) being the market share in segment
prot and nki = nk (wki , wkj ) ≡
2
k ∈ {L, H} .
Retail equilibrium. The surplus generated when oering quantity q to a customer
of type θk is dened as follows: sk (q, c) ≡ uk (q) − cq . By the same reasoning as in
FB
section 3, it is optimal to oer subscribers of type θk the quantity qk
that maximizes
52
the surplus which is generated at perceived marginal costs ci :

with

qkF B (ci ) ≡ arg max {uk (q) − qci }
q

By denition, we have

uk (qkF B ) = θk v(ci ).

Solving for the equilibrium net surplus and

market share yields

∗

wki
n∗ki



1
2
1
+ θk
v(ci ) + v(cj )
= −
2σ
3
3
1 θk σ
=
+
(v(ci ) − v(cj ))
2
3

(22)

If both competitors have equal perceived marginal costs, then each of them controls
1
1
∗
R∗
a market share of nki =
in the candidate retail equilibrium. This implies πki =
2
2σ
and therefore the per customer prots are constant across both segments. Inserting the
optimal taris in (21) and rearranging yields that for perceived marginal costs

(ci , cj ),

the retail equilibrium prots are:

ΠR∗
i

σρ
1
= Π (ci , cj ) ≡
(vi − vj )2 +
9
σ
R∗



1
+ σ (vi − vj )
2

2

51 In contrast to section 3, we express the problem in terms of the per customer quantity
price

pki

(23)

qki

of the

since this makes it easier to consider more complicated pricing structures when discussing

second-degree price discrimination.

52 The quantity

qkF B

equals the quantity that would be chosen by a subscriber when the per call

price equals the perceived marginal costs.
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where

vi ≡ v(ci )

as before. Comparing this equation to (9) reveals that consumer

heterogeneity does not aect the retail prots if

ci = cj .

However, for

ci 6= cj

both

operators earn higher retail prots compared to section 3. This can be best understood

average

by noting that given the perceived marginal costs (c0 , c1 ) the
market share of
∗
∗
∗
both operators ni = βniL + (1 − β) niH equals the market share that obtains in case of
∗
∗
homogenous subscribers. For ci 6= cj , niL 6= niH so that both operators are better of
since the retail prots are convex in the market share.
A marginal change in perceived marginal costs aects the retail prots as follows:

σρ
1
∂ΠR∗
(ci , cj ) ≡
(vi − vj )2 +
∂ci
9
σ



2
1
+ σ (vi − vj )
2

(24)

It is useful to dene the total equilibrium demand for roaming calls of operator

i

as

follows:

FB
FB
Qi (ci , cj ) ≡ βn∗iL qiL
+ (1 − β) n∗iH qiH
Using the previous results and simplifying yields:


1 σ
+ (v(ci ) − v(cj )) (1 + ρ)
Qi = Q(ci , cj ) ≡ q(ci )
2 3


The previous equation shows that consumer heterogeneity renders the mean quantity
more sensible to dierences in the perceived costs. The reason is that according to (22),
an operator that faces higher costs also oers less attractive taris.
increases in the subscriber's type. Since the level of dierentiation

σ

This dierence

is independent of

the type, the market shares in the heavy user segment are always less balanced than in
the light user segment.

Wholesale equilibrium.

As in section 5, we now consider two competing alliances.

The negotiated wholesale prices equal the perceived marginal costs when setting the
retail oers. The prots per member of the alliance remain dened as in (12), using the
retail equilibrium prots (24). For small dierences between

a0

and

a1 ,53

the marginal

prots are:



1
σ
∂Πi
(ai , aj ) =
− (ai ) Q(ai , aj ) − (ai − c) (1 + ρ) q(ai )2
∂ai
3
3
We can characterize the the symmetric equilibrium wholesale price in a compact

roaming calls

way, after dening the equilibrium share of
(in contrast to the market
1
σ
∗
share of
) as follows: ñi =
+
(v(c
)
−
v(c
i
j )) (1 + ρ). Note that the
2
3
∗
additional factor 1 + ρ indicates that the equilibrium share of roaming calls ñi reacts

subscribers

more sensitively to dierences in wholesale prices compared to the equilibrium share of
∗
subscribers ni . Rearranging the rst order condition, yields:

a∗ − c
1

= 
∗
a
3 ηq (a∗ ) + ηñ∗i (a∗ )

(25)

with ηq (ai ) being the price elasticity of the mean per customer demand and ηñ∗ (ai ) ≡
i
dñ∗i ai
− dai ñ∗ being the price elasticity of the equilibrium share of calls. In particular, in a
i

53 |v(a

0)

− v(a1 )| <

3σ
2θH
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ñ∗i =

2σ
1
and ηñi (ai ) =
(1 + ρ) ai q(ai ).
2
3
Now we can identify the eect of consumer heterogeneity on the candidate equilibrium

symmetric equilibrium the share of roaming calls is
wholesale price:

Proposition 13 Suppose that 25 uniquely characterizes the equilibrium wholesale price.
Then an increase in consumer heterogeneity ρ, holding everything else constant, reduces
the symmetric wholesale equilibrium price.
Proof.

1
∗
In any equilibrium, condition (25) must be satised. Observe that for ñi =
2
ηñi (ai ) = 2σ
(1 + ρ) ai q(a
3
 i ) is increasing in ρ. By the same reasoning as in the proof
ai −c
of proposition 6, 3
ηq (ai ) + ηñ∗i (ai ) − 1 is increasing in ai . Applying the implicit
ai
da∗
< 0.
function theorem on condition (25) yields then
dρ
Intuitively, consumer heterogeneity renders reducing the wholesale price more profitable since this allows to attract disproportionately many heavy users.

Non observable customer types:

We now argue that even when customer types

are unobservable for the MNOs, the results of this section are likely to remain intact.
Since customers' type

θk

is now unobersable to the operators, they have to elicit this

information by oering incentive compatible contracts. Without loss of generality, we
consider direct revelation mechanisms. We slightly modify the retail pricing structure
and allow operators to oer quantity
tari

THi

for heavy users.

54

When joining operator

i,

qLi

at tari

TLi

for light users and quantity

qHi

at

heavy users select the package which is designed for them

if:

wHi ≥ wLi + ∆u(qLi )
where

∆u(q) ≡ uH (q) − uL (q).

(26)

Likewise, the incentive constraint for light users is:

wLi ≥ wHi − ∆u(qHi )

(27)

It turns out that in any symmetric equilibrium, the incentive constraints (26) and
(27) are slack. This at rst glance surprising result is in line with the observation of
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002), that private information
of consumers may not cause any quantity distortions in competitive environments.

55

To conrm that the sorting conditions are satised, we insert the retail equilibrium

54 Due to the consumer heterogeneity and in contrast to section 3, operators can now generally do
better than oering two part taris. Therefore, we allow operators in this section to set the quantity
for each segment instead of the price per call. However, it turns out that the optimal quantity for each
type of customer would equal the quantity that this customer would consume if the per call price was
set to the perceived marginal costs.

55 They also discuss the sensitivity of this result with respect to crucial assumptions like symmetry.
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taris

56

into (26) and (27), yielding the following requirement for

FB
sL (qLF B (ci ), ci )−sL (qH
(ci ), ci ) ≥
FB
By denition of qL (ci ) and
right hand side is non-positive.

v(cj ) + v(ci ):57

1
FB
(θH − θL ) (v(cj ) − v(ci )) ≥ sH (qLF B (ci ), ci )−sH (qH
(ci ), ci )
3
(28)
FB
qH (ci ) the left hand side is non-negative while the
Therefore, if c0 and c1 are close enough together,

(26) and (27) are not binding for both operators.

In particular, this is true in any

symmetric candidate equilibrium where c0 = c1 . This means that any wholesale prices
a∗0 = a∗1 = a∗ that satisfy (25) for n∗i = 21 also locally maximize the operators' prots in
case they cannot observe the subscribers' type. Whenever these prices are also global
maximizers, they form an equilibrium even if operators have to resort to second degree
price dierentiation on the retail market.

8.2

Allowing for per customer wholesale fees

So far, we have assumed that operators can only charge linear prices on the wholesale
level.

This assumption reects roughly the wholesale price structure that is used in

practice at the moment. However, in this section we show that two-part taris on the
upstream level render alliances even more protable. More precisely, we assume that
operators may both charge a per call wholesale-price

axi

as above and a fee

has to be paid for any foreign customer that visits the network.

58

φxi

that

As in section 5, we

assume that operators with same position have formed alliances. We focus on country

A

(by symmetry the same results hold for country

brevity. The retail prot of operator

φi

i

B)

and omit the country index for

conditional on alliance

i

having agreed on

ai and

reads as follows:

R
ΠR
i = Π (pi , wi , wj , ai , φi ) ≡ n(wi , wj )[q(pi )(pi − ai ) + v(pi ) − wi − φi − CF ]

(29)

The per customer customer fee enters as perceived xed costs and therefore renders
customers less attractive for the operator in the retail market. The optimal retail per
call price remains equal to the wholesale per call price of the alliance. By the same
dwj∗
n∗ dw∗
i)
R∗
,
= − q(c3i ) and similar
reasoning as in section 3 we still have πi
= σi , daii = − 2q(c
3
dai
∗
dw
dwi∗
= − 23 and dφji = − 13 .
computations yield
dφi
Using these results for the retail market, the modied rst order conditions which
∗
characterize the optimal per call wholesale price ãi and the optimal per customer whole∗
sale fee φi are as follows:

σ R∗ σ W ∗
π = π̃i + n∗i (ã∗i )
3 i
3

(30)

56 Whenever the optimal net surplus given by equation (22) satises (28), then it is indeed a maximizer of retail prots. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, setting the ecient quantity

qkF B (ci )

and net surplus as given in (22) maximizes retail prot in any segment. If this solution yields

a maximum of the unrestricted problem, it remains the solution of the restricted problem, as long as
conditions (26) and (27) are satised.

57 The rst inequality comes from the upward incentive constraint and the second from the downward

incentive constraint.

58 Note that this pricing structure diers from two-part taris used for example as franchise fees. In

our setup, the xed fee

φxi

is paid for any customer. In contrast, a franchise fee is paid only once.
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πiR∗ = π̃iW ∗

(31)

where

π̃iW ∗ = q(a∗i ) (ã∗i − c) + φ∗i
denotes the per customer wholesale prot and

(·) denotes the per customer demand

elasticity in terms of markup.

∗
∗
∗
Inserting condition (31) into condition (30) yields ni (ãi ) = 0 which for ni 6= 0
∗
is only satised for ãi = c. Hence as long as operator i expects to achieve a strictly
positive retail market share, it is optimal to set the wholesale per call price equal to
the true marginal costs.
The following proposition uses this insight to establish that if operators have the
possibility to charge wholesale per customer fees, equilibrium prots will be higher and
consumers will be worse o.

Proposition 14 Suppose operators have formed two competing alliances. If each alliance can negotiate both on wholesale per call prices and on per customer fees, there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium wholesale per call prices are
set at the true marginal costs and wholesale prots are π̃iW ∗ = φ∗i = 2σ1 . Compared to
any symmetric equilibrium without per customer fees, each operator's wholesale prot
is higher. Let a∗ denote the symmetric equilibrium wholesale price that obtains under
linear wholesale prices and is characterized by Proposition
(5). Then introducing per
R a∗i
customer wholesale fees increases total welfare by − c (x − c) q 0 (x)dx.
Proof.

1
∗
First note that in any symmetric equilibrium, each operator has market share ni =
2
1
∗
R∗
and hence earns retail prots of πi
= 2σ . Inserting these values and ãi = c into
1
∗
equation (31) yields φi =
. Furthermore, this critical point is a maximum, since
2σ
∂2Π
1
σ
(φi , φj ) = − 3 − 9 < 0 for (φi , φj ) such that n∗i ∈ (0, 1). It can be easily veried
∂φ2i
3
3
that Π(φi , φj ) ≤ Π(φj −
, φj ) for all φi < φj − 2σ
, so that cornering the market is
2σ
never optimal. If wholesale per customer fees are not feasible, rearranging equation (13)
yields:

π W (a∗i ) = π R,∗ (a∗i , aj ) − 3σn∗i (a∗i )
n∗i =

1
1
1
W
∗
, this simplies to π (ai ) =
− 32 σ(a∗i ) < 2σ
= π̃iW ∗ .
2
2σ
As by assumption the whole market is covered in both cases, the dierence in
R q(a∗i ) 0
∗
∗
welfare is: ∆W F = u(q(c)) − cq(c) − u(q(ai )) + cq(ai ) = −
u (x) − cdx =
q(c)
R a∗i
− c (x − c) q 0 (x)dx > 0.
Inserting market share

Intuitively, increasing the per customer fee allows to soften retail competition more
eciently than by increasing the wholesale per call price within an alliance. Introducing
per customer fees reduces the per customer retail prots for any net surplus and retail
per call price. However, by raising the per customer fee and setting the wholesale price
equal to the true marginal costs, members of an alliance leave the retail per call price
at the socially optimal level and therefore avoid deadweight loss.
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9 Conclusion
This paper presents a tractable model of international roaming in which operators
compete both on a wholesale and retail market simultaneously.

We have accounted

for recent technological developments and based our analysis on the assumption that
MNOs may determine which foreign network their subscribers use to place roaming
calls. We have shown that operators have incentives to form alliances that mutually
provide roaming services at ineciently high wholesale prices which translate to high
retail prices. We have also shown that the ban of mutual roaming agreements might
bring down roaming prices. Our suggestion might have constituted an easier approach
than the price cap on roaming prices which was introduced by the European Parliament
in 2007.

A Appendix - Proofs of Lemmas & Propositions
A.1

Proof of Lemma 1:

3
2σ
there exists a unique equilibrium in pure weakly undominated strategies, which entails
n∗i = 1 and n∗j = 0.
∗
We rst establish that any such corner equilibrium necessarily involves pi = ci ,
1
wi∗ = 2σ
− CF + v(cj ), p∗j = cj and wj∗ = v(cj ) − CF . Dene w̃i such that given
wj , v(ci ), v(cj ), operator i just serves the whole market: 21 + σ (w̃i − wj ) = 1. Note that
∗
∗
whenever ni = 1 then necessarily wi = w̃i as setting wi > w̃i (wj ) would yield strictly
∗
∗
lower prots and wi < w̃i would contradict ni = 1.
∗
∗
∗
We now show that whenever nj = 0, then necessarily wj = v(cj ) − CF and pj = cj :
R
∗
Any strategy (wj , pj ) with π (wj , pj ) < 0 is weakly dominated by pj = cj and wj = wj .
R
Any strategy with π (wj , pj ) ≥ 0 and pj 6= cj is weakly dominated by choosing pj = cj
(We omit the country index for brevity). We show that whenever

v(ci ) − v(cj ) ≥

and while leaving wj constant as this increases prots per customer. Hence we have
p∗j = cj in any equilibrium. It remains to show that whenever n∗j = 0, then wj∗ =
v(cj ) − CF . Suppose to the contrary that wj < v(cj ) − CF . By the preceding discussion,
necessarily

wi = w̃i (wj ).

Then player

j

could achieve a strictly positive market share
v(cj )−CF −wj
and per customer prot by deviating to wj +
which contradicts equilibrium.
2
3
We now show that a unique corner equilibrium arises i v(ci ) − v(cj ) ≥
: (If2σ
1
∗
∗
Existence) Given, wj = v(cj ) − CF and wi =
− CF + v(cj ), it can be directly
2σ
R
∂ΠR
∗
∗
veried that
(wi , wj , ci ) > 0 for wi < wi and ∂Π
(wj , wi∗ , ci ) < 0 for wj > wj∗
∂wi
∂wj
∗
∗
which together with the preceeding paragraphs conrms that wi and wj are mutually
prot maximizing. (If-Uniqueness): There exists no interior equilibrium since inserting
3
∗
v(ci ) − v(cj ) ≥ 2σ
into (8) yields ni ≥ 1 which is not interior. By the reasoning
above, there is only one corner equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. (Only3
∗
if ): Suppose that 0 ≤ v(ci ) − v(cj ) <
: For wj = v(cj ) − CF as required in any corner
2σ
∗
∗
equilibrium, the best response of player i is wi < w̃i which implies ni < 1 and therefore
causes a contradiction.
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A.2

Proof of Lemma 3:

Note rst that any trembling hand perfect equilibrium contains no weakly dominated
strategy (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), p. 259).
∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
Suppose to the contrary that n (ai , aj ) = 1 which implies Π(aj , ai ) = 0. Dene
the highest wholesale price that allows to corner the market ai implicitely by v(ai ) =
3
∗
. We show that any trembling-hand perfect equilibrium requires ai ≥ c since
v(a∗j ) + 2σ
∗
∗
any ai < c is weakly dominated by ai = c: Whenever aj is such that ai < c, then for
 1
 ∗ σ W

∂Π
−
ai ∈ (ai , c), by equation(13), ∂a
(a
,
a
)
=
q(a
)
−
(a
)
n
π
(a
)
> 0 since
i
j
i
i
i
i
3
3
i
∂Π
W
π (ai ) < 0 and (ai ) ≤ 0. For ai < ai , ∂ai (ai , aj ) = −q(ai )(ai ) ≥ 0. Thus for ai < c
∗
∗
∗
∗
and for any ai < c, Π(c, aj ) > Π(ai , aj ). If ai ≥ c, then Π(c, aj ) ≥ Π(ai , aj ).
1
∗
∗ ∗
R ∗ ∗
Since ai ≥ c, the corner equilibrium involves Π(ai , aj ) ≥ Π (ai , aj ) ≥
. Then
σ
1
∗
∗
∗
contradicting optimality of aj .
deviating to aˆj = ai yields Π(aˆj , ai ) ≥
4σ

A.3

Proof of Lemma 4:

We prove the following properties that together imply the claim.
∗
For all (ai , aj ) s.t. n (ai , aj ) ∈ (0, 1) the following inequalities hold:
∂Π(ai ,aj )
i) If ai < c then
> 0.
∂ai
ii) If q(ai ) = 0 then Π(c, aj ) > Π(ai , aj ).
∂Π(ai ,aj )
1
iii) If ai > c, q(ai ) > 0 and (ai ) ≥
then
< 0.
3
∂ai
∂Π(ai ,aj )
3
iv) If assumption 2 holds and ai > c, q(ai ) > 0, v(ai ) < v(c) −
then
< 0.
2σ
∂ai
Part i)
W
By assumption 1, q(ai ) ≥ q(c) > 0 which implies that π (ai ) < 0 for ai < c and
∂Π
(ai , aj ) > 0.
thus by equation (13),
∂ai
Part ii)
0

ai with q(ai ) = 0 implies that ai > c and q (ai ) = 0 by assumption 1. As
0
0
q(a ) = 0 ∀a ≥ ai , we have v(aj ) ≥ v(ai ) and hence n∗ (ai , aj ) ≤ 21 . In addition,
q(ai ) = 0 implies q(ai ) (ai − c) = 0. Hence Π(ai , aj ) = σ1 n∗ (ai , aj )2 < σ1 n∗ (c, aj )2 ≤
Π(c, aj ) holds which contradicts ai being optimal. To see that Π(c, aj ) ≥ σ1 n∗ (c, aj )2 ,
1 ∗
3
2
, then Π(c, aj ) = n (c, aj ) by Lemma 1. If
distinguish two cases: if v(c) − v(aj ) ≤
2σ
σ
3
1
1 ∗
W
2
v(c) − v(aj ) > 2σ
, then by the same Lemma πi >
and hence Π(c, aj ) > n (c, aj ) .
σ
σ
Any

Part iii)
Since

(ai ) ≥

1
and
3

q(ai )(ai −c) > 0,

0

∂Π
(ai , aj )
∂ai

= q(ai )

 −σ
3

q(ai )(ai − c) + n∗ (ai , aj )

1
3

− (ai )



<

Part iv)

1
1
then by part iii) the claim follows. If (ai ) <
then by assump3
3
0
tion 2, for all ãi ∈ [c, ai ], (ãi ) < (ai ). By denition v (p) = −q(p) and the condition
R ai
0
3
3
v(c) − v(ai ) < 2σ
is equivalent to
q(a)da < 2σ
. By assumption 2,  (ãi ) ≥ 0 for
c
R
R
a
a
ãi ∈ R[c, ai ] and thus π W (ai ) = c i (1 − (a)) q(a)da ≥ (1 − (ai )) c i q(a)da. Thereai
3
3
∂Π
W
implies π (ai ) ≥ (1 − (ai ))
. From (13) we have
(a , a ) ≤
fore,
q(a)da ≥ 2σ
2σ
∂ai  i j
c
1




σ W
1
1
1
1
− (ai ) − 3 π (ai ) q(ai ) ≤ 3 − (ai ) − 2 (1 − (ai )) q(ai ) = 2 − 3 − (ai ) q(ai ) <
3
0 where the rst inequality is because 13 − (ai ) n∗i ≤ 31 − (ai ).
If

A.4

(ai ) ≥

Proof of Proposition 5

We rst prove the following auxiliary Lemma:
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Lemma 15 If assumption 2 holds, then:
i) π W (ai ) is concave on E in ai .
ii) Given aj ∈ E , any ai ∈ E that satises the rst order necessary conditions for being
a local maximum of Π(ai , aj ) in E strictly maximizes Π(ai , aj ) in E .
Proof.

∂π W
∂p

2 W

0

0

(p) = (p−c)q (p)+q(p) = q(p) (1 − (p)). Hence ∂∂pπ2 (p) = q (p) (1 − (p))−
0
0
q (p)  (p) < 0 as  (p) > 0 by assumption 2 and 1 − (p) > 0 for p ∈ E .
0
0
Part ii) Suppose that ai , ai ∈ E , ai 6= ai . By denition of E , ∀ai , aj ∈ E , since
0
∂Π(ai ,aj )
∗
|v(c) − v(ai )| < 3σ
we have n (ai , aj ) ∈ (0, 1). We show that
(ai − ai ) ≥ 0
2
∂ai



0
∂Π(ai ,aj )
59
implies Π(ai , aj ) > Π(ai , aj ).
By (13),
= q(ai ) 13 − (ai ) n∗i − σ3 π W (ai ) on
∂ai
Part i)

E.

∂Π(a ,a )

ϕ(ai , aj ) ≡ (1 − 3(ai )) n∗i − σπ W (ai ) and note that ∂aii j =
2

0
∂ϕ(ai ,aj )
=
−2σq(a
)
−
(a
)
−3 (ai )n∗i < 0 as σ > 0, (ai ) < 13
i
i
∂ai
3

For brevity, dene

1
q(ai )ϕ(ai , aj ). Then
3
and

0

 (ai ) ≥ 0

by assumption 2.

∂Π(ai ,aj )
∂ai

We rst show that

q(ai ) > 0

∂Π(ai ,aj )
in E ,
∂ai

and together with

≤0

0

≤ 0

implies

implies

ϕ(ai , aj ) ≤
0

q(ai ) > 0

we get

∂Π(ai ,aj )
∂ai

∂Π(ai ,aj )
∂ai

< 0

for

∂ϕ(a ,a )
0. But ∂aii j

0

ai > a i :

<0

By (13) and

implies

0

ϕ(ai , aj ) < 0

< 0.
0

0
∂Π(a ,a )
∂Π(ai ,aj )
∂Π(a ,a )
We next show that
≥ 0 implies ∂aii j > 0 for ai < ai : ∂aii j ≥ 0 implies
∂ai
0
∂ϕ(a ,a )
ϕ(ai , aj ) ≥ 0 and by ∂aii j < 0 we get ϕ(ai , aj ) > 0. Together with q(ai ) > 0 we get
0
∂Π(ai ,aj )
> 0.
∂ai

Proof of Proposition 5.
We rst show existence

∗
∗
∗
of a symmetric equilibrium a0 = a1 = a and consequently
n∗0 = n∗1 = 12 . By Lemma 4 this equilibrium involves a∗ ∈ E . Dene ψ(p) ≡ (1 − 3(p))−
W
0
2σπ W (p). Note that by assumption 2, and as ∂π∂p (p) > 0 for (p) < 1, we have ψ (p) < 0
1
∗
in the interior of E . Using (13) and ni =
, the necessary rst order condition is
2
∗
ψ(a ) = 0. Note that ψ(c) = 1 > 0. Distinguish two cases:

•


p ∈ R such that (p) = 13 .60 Dene p̃ = min p ∈ P |(p) = 31 .
W
Then ψ(p̃) = −2σπ (p̃) < 0. By continuity there must exist a unique â in R+
such that ψ(â) = 0.

•

There does not exist some

There exists some

(p) = 13 . Then for all p ≥ c,
p ∈ E and hence ψ (p) < 0. In addition, using (p) < 31 ∀p ≥ c implies that
limp→∞ π W (p) = ∞.61 Hence limp→∞ ψ(p) = −∞ and again there exists a unique
â in E such that ψ(â) = 0.
p ∈ P

such that

0

ψ(â) = 0 and q(â) > 0 can only be satised for â ∈ E
interval E , â is unique in E .

By Lemma 4,
in the

and since

0

ψ (a) < 0

59 This property is usually denoted strict pseudoconcavity and is stronger than strict
quasiconcavity.

60 If

q(p) = 0

for some

p,

61 Integrating up −(p−c)q (p)
q(p)

π(p) ≥ π(p)

h

p−c
p−c

i 23

p̃ < p with (p̃) =
R 0 (p)
R
∀p ≥ c yields qq(p)
dp ≥ − 32

then there must exist
0

≤

1
3

which goes to innity as
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It remains to show that the candidate
denition of

ψ

,

ai = â

â

is indeed a symmetric equilibrium.

satises the necessary rst order condition when

aj = â.

By
By

Lemma 15, the rst order conditions are also sucient for being a global maximum on

E.

ai = â remains a maximizer on the set of all ai ∈ R such
n(ai , aj ) ∈ (0, 1). Setting ai high enough so that ni = 0 cannot be optimal either,

By the proof of Lemma 4,

that

as this gives zero prots.

Π(â, â) ≥ Π(ãi , â) for ãi such that n(ãi , â) = 1. Since â ∈ E ,
3
3
holds. Cornering the market requires v(ãi ) ≥ v(â) +
,
the inequality v(c) < v(â) +
2σ
2σ
3
and thus ãi < c . For any ai < c such that v(ai ) > v(aj ) +
, marginal prots are
2σ
∂Π
(a
,
a
)
=
−q(a
)(a
)
≥
0
since
(a
)
≤
0
.
Thus
Π(ã
,
â)
≤
Π(c,
â) < Π(â, â).
i j
i
i
i
i
∂ai
It remains to show that

Uniqueness:

There is no other symmetric equilibrium since any interior equilibrium must belong
to

E

and since the necessary rst order condition is uniquely satised in

E

at

â

by the

previous discussion.
We now show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists:

∗
∗
Suppose to the contrary that an asymmetric equilibrium with ai > aj and hence
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
ni < nj exists. By assumption 2 ai > aj implies (ai ) ≥ (aj ). By Lemma 3, this
equilibrium must involve a strictly positive market share for both alliances and a strictly
positive per customer demand. The necessary rst order conditions are:




1
∗
− (ai ) n∗i −
3


1
∗
− (aj ) n∗j −
3

σ W ∗
π (ai ) = 0
3
σ W ∗
π (aj ) = 0
3


1
∗
∗
∗
∗
− (a∗i ) n∗i < 31 − (a∗j ) n∗j . Furthermore,
But (ai ) ≥ (aj ) and ni < nj implies
3
1
∗ ∗
by Lemma 4, ai , aj ∈ E . Hence
≥ (a∗i ) ≥ (a∗j ) and thus π W (a∗i ) > π W (a∗j ). Taken
3


1
together this implies
− (a∗i ) n∗i − σ3 π W (a∗i ) < n∗j 31 − (a∗j ) − σ3 π W (a∗j ) = 0 which
3
contradicts the rst order necessary conditions.
∗
∗ ∗ ∗
Finally, we show that a > c: Any equilibrium involves n (ai , aj ) ∈ (0, 1). The
∗
∗ q(c)
∗
necessary rst order condition (13) for ai = c is n (c, aj )
= 0 which is never true as
3
q(c) > 0 by assumption 1.
∗
Rearranging the equilibrium condition ψ(a ) = 0 yields the equilibrium per customer
prots.

A.5

Proof of Proposition 6

Rewriting condition 14 for a symmetric equilibrium yields

2σq(a∗ ) (a∗ − c) + 3(a∗ ) − 1 = 0

(32)

Part i) Applying the implicit function theorem on this condition, the claim is
0
∂
true if
(2σq(a∗ ) (a∗ − c) + 3(a∗ )) > 0. By assumption 2,  (a∗ ) > 0. In addition,
∂a
∂
q(a∗ ) (a∗ − c) > 0 since (a∗ ) < 13 which completes the proof.
∂a
Part ii) Consider any pair of demand functions q and q̃ with ηq̃ (a) > ηq (a) ∀a ∈ P
a−c
∗
∗
and q̃(a ) ≥ q(a ). Since (a) = ηq (a)
, ηq̃ (a) > ηq (a) implies q̃ (a) > q (a) for
a
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∗
We show that the equilibrium wholesale price ã that corresponds to per
∗
customer demand q̃ is higher than the equilibrium price a for demand q . By the proof

a − c > 0.

ψq (a) ≡ 2σq(a) (a − c) + 3q (a) − 1 is increasing in a for
ψq (c) = −1. Dene ψq̃ (a) likewise for demand q̃. To show that ã∗ ∈ (c, a∗ ),
∗
∗
just note that ψq̃ (a ) > ψq (a ) = 0 where the rst inequality comes from the hypothesis
q̃(a∗ ) ≥ q(a∗ ) and q̃ (a) − q (a) > 0 and the last equality is the equilibrium condition
∗
∗
of a being an equilibrium for demand q . Since ψq̃ (a ) > 0, by continuity there exists
∗
∗
∗
an ã < a such that ψq̃ (ã ) = 0. This equilibrium candidate is indeed an equilibrium
for demand q̃ by the proof of proposition 5.
of proposition 5, the function

a∈E

and

A.6

Proof of Proposition 8

We rst prove the following auxiliary Lemma:

Lemma 16 If assumption 2 holds and q0 (a∗ ) < 0, then v(c) − v(a∗ ) <
the equilibrium wholesale price dened by Proposition 5.
Proof.
The equilibrium condition
Assumption 2 implies that

1
to
3

= 0

yields

, where a∗ is

π W ∗ ≡ q(a∗ )(a∗ − c) =

1−3(a∗ )
.
2σ

π W (p)
for any p ∈ E . Putting these results
1−(p)
∗
1−3(a )
1
< 2σ
where the last inequality is due
2σ(1−(a∗ ))

v(c) − v(p) ≤

v(c) − v(a∗ ) ≤
≥ (a∗ ) > 0.

together yields

∂Π
(a∗ , a∗ )
∂ai

1
2σ

π W (a∗ )
1−(a∗ )

=

existence

We now show
of a unique symmetric equilibrium. Denote the wholesale
∗
price that obtains after the retail price cap has been introduced by a and the equi∗
librium net surplus as w . By the same reasoning as in Lemma 15, the rst order
condition is sucient for a (local) maximum. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5, we
∗
6 ∂Π
(a, a) = 1 − 2σq(p)(a − c). We claim that that wholesale prices
dene ψ(a) ≡
q(p) ∂ai
∗
∗
a0 = a1 = a with a being uniquely characterized by ψ(a∗ ) = 0 support an equilibrium.
∗
By denition of ψ , the equilibrium price a locally strictly maximizes both alliances'
prots.

Π(ai , a∗ )

is strictly quasiconcave in ai if both alliances have
n∗ (ai , aj ) ≡ 12 + σ3 [v(ai ) − v(aj )] using the gener ∗

q(p)
∂Π
σ W
∗
∗
alized value v(·) of (15). For ai ≥ p,
(a
,
a
)
=
n
(a
,
a
)
−
π
(a
)
with
i
i
i
∂ai
3
3
∂Π
W
∗ ∗
∗
∗
π (ai ) ≡ q(p)(ai − c). Since ∂ai (a , a ) = 0 and n (ai , a ) decreases in ai while
Next we show that

a positive market share:

Dene

∂Π
(a∗ − ai ) ∂a
(ai , a∗ ) > 0 for ai > p and ai 6= a∗ . For
i


q(ai )
∂Π
∗
∗
W
ai < p, ∂a
(a
,
a
)
=
(1
−
3(a
))
n
(a
,
a
)
−
σπ
(a
)
which diers from 13 only
i
i
i
j
i
3
i
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
by the market share n (ai , a ) instead of n (ai , a ). We show below that v(a ) < v(a )
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
which implies n (ai , a ) > n (ai , a ) for ai < p. Since by hypothesis p ≤ a , we have
∂Π
∂Π
(ai , a∗ ) > ∂ai (ai , a∗ ) > 0 where the last inequality is due to Lemma (15).
∂ai

π W (ai )

increases in

ai ,

we have

It remains to prove that drastic deviations in order to corner the market are un∗
protable. We rst show that given p < a , any deviation wholesale price ãi to corner
the market requires that ãi < c or equivalently v(ãi ) > v(c). To derive a lower bound
Rp
∗
∗
∗
∗
W∗
for v ≡ v(a ), note that v = v(p) − q(p) (a − p) = v(c) − π
− c (p)q(p)dp with
1
π W ∗ ≡ q(p)(a∗ − c). The equilibrium condition ψ(a∗ ) = 0 implies π W ∗ = 2σ
. Besides,
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Rp

1
,
(p)q(p)dp ≤ (p) (v(c) − v(p)) ≤ 13 (v(c) − v(a∗ )) < 6σ
c
4
∗
. Cornerwhere the last inequality is due to Lemma 16. Taken together, v > v(c) −
6σ
3
5
∗
ing the market requires v(ãi ) ≥ v +
>
v(c)
+
>
v(c)
. For any ai < c such that
2σ
6σ
∂Π
v(ai ) > v ∗ + v(aj ) , marginal prots are ∂a
(a
,
a
)
i j = −q(ai )(ai ) ≥ 0 since (ai ) ≤ 0.
i
∗
∗
∗ ∗
Thus Π(ãi , a ) ≤ Π(c, a ) < Π(a , a ).

p ≤ a∗ ∈ E

guarantees that

The preceeding two paragraphs establish that there is no protable deviation, which
completes the proof of existence.
∗
∗
We now show that v < v(a ), which by help of Lemma 7 suces to prove that any
∗
binding price cap reduces the consumer surplus. The condition v(p) − q(p) (a − p) <
W∗
∗
∗
v(a ) can be rewritten as v(p)+q(p) (p − c)−π < v(a ) and is satised if v(c)−π W ∗ <
1
v(a∗ ) since v(p) + q(p) (p − c) ≤ v(c). Reordering this condition and using π W ∗ = 2σ
1
∗
yields v(c) − v(a ) <
which is true by Lemma 16.
2σ
∗
∗
∗
∗
If p < a , then clearly v(p) + q(p) (p − c) > v(a ) + q(a ) (a − c) and total welfare
increases.

ψ(a) to ψ(a) dened in the proof of Proposition 5 yields ψ(a) − ψ(a) =
3(a) + 2σ (q(a) − q(p) (a − c). Therefore, the condition ψ(a∗ ) > ψ(a∗ ) = 0 holds by
0
3(a∗ )
∗
∗
. Since ψ (a) = −σq(p) < 0, ψ(a ) > 0 implies
the hypothesis q(p) − q(a ) <
∗
2σ(a −c)
ψ(a∗ ) = 0 for a∗ > a∗ .
Comparing

A.7

Proof of Lemma 9

Part i)

ai , aj ∈ E , n∗ (ai , aj ) ∈ (0, 1) by denition of E .
We show that for any aj ∈ E there exists a unique â ∈ E such that ϕ(â, aj ) ≡
∂Π(a ,a )
(1 − 3(ai )) n∗ (â, aj ) − σπ W (ai ) = 0. Since ∂aii j = 13 q(ai )ϕ(ai , aj ) and by Lemma 15,
part ii), ai = â strictly maximizes Π(ai , aj ) in E . By Lemma 4, â remains a strict
maximizer in R.
∗
Note that ϕ(c, aj ) = n (c, aj ) > 0. Distinguish two cases:

• There exists some p ∈ R such that (p) = 13 . Dene p̃ = min p ∈ R|(p) = 31 .
∂ϕ(ai ,aj )
W
Then ϕ(p̃, aj ) = −σπ (p̃) < 0. By continuity and by
< 0 for ai , aj ∈ E ,
∂ai
there must exist a unique â (which is necessarily in E ) such that ϕ(â, aj ) = 0.
Note that for all

•

1
There does not exist some p ∈ R such that (p) =
. Then for all ai ≥ c,
3
∂ϕ(ai ,aj )
ai ∈ E and hence
< 0. In addition, using (ai ) < 31 ∀ai ≥ c implies
∂ai
W
that limai →∞ π (ai ) = ∞. Hence limai →∞ ϕ(ai ) = −∞ and again there exists a
unique

â

in

E

such that

ϕ(â, aj ) = 0.

Part ii)

a∗ (aj )

Any prot maximizing wholesale price

involves

∂Π
(a∗ (aj ), aj )
∂ai

= 0.

By

∂2Π ∗
(a (aj ), aj )
Lemma 15, part ii), any critical point is also a strict maximum which implies
∂a2i
∂2Π
∗
0. Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, the claim is true if ∂ai ∂aj (a (aj ), aj ) > 0.
Dierentiating (13) with respect to

aj

yields

∂2Π
(a∗ (aj ), aj )
∂ai ∂aj

= σ3 q(ai )2

1
3

<


− (ai ) > 0.

Part iii)
Follows immediately from Lemma 4 and condition (14)
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A.8

Proof of Proposition 10

We rst show that operators in country

B

announce to form an alliance if this increases

the total number of alliances. Suppose that operator
an alliance, but all other operators do so.
well as one operator in country
alliance

j

anticipates that

Ai

A,

and

say

Bi

Bi

does

not

announce to form

Then one alliance is formed and

Ai,

remain without alliance.

Bi

as

The remaining

will provide and purchase roaming services at
aj = a∗ (c) that

the true marginal costs and sets the intra-alliance wholesale price
maximizes the prots of its members.

According to Lemma 9, this price uniquely
∗
exists and exceeds the true marginal costs: a (c) > c. For operator Bi this yields
R∗
∗
prots Π (c, a (c)) (using notation of section 3). Since own prots increase in the
competitors' wholesale prices, the following string of inequalities holds by Lemma 9:
ΠR∗ (c, a∗ (c)) = Π(c, a∗ (c)) < Π(c, a∗ ) < Π(a∗ , a∗ ) with a∗ (c) < a∗ and a∗ dened
by proposition 5.

Bi

Hence operator

has higher prots if it announces to form an
∗
alliance, too. Lemma 9 also implies that Π(a (c), c) > Π(c, c) which makes announcing
an alliance a best response for
an alliance and
country,

B,

Bj

Bi

if only one operator in

declares to stay alone.

62

A

has announced to form

Given the best response of operators of

the same reasoning for operators in country

A

yields the result.

B Appendix - Continuous model of network selection
We assume that at most the proportion
to a particular foreign network.

63

γ̄ ∈ [0.5, 1]

of roaming calls can be directed

This bound on the proportion reects the fact that

the restriction does not come from capacity constraints (which would render an absolute constraint more plausible) but rather from an unreliable technology that cannot
guarantee that a subscriber registers in the preferred network. We have analyzed the
polar case of perfect network selection ( γ̄

= 1)

in the base model.

have presented the other extreme of no control ( γ̄

= 0.5),

In section 7 we

meaning that each foreign

network hosts a travelling subscriber equally likely. As in section 7, operators cannot
discriminate on the retail market according to which foreign network is used abroad.
For clarity, we present the results from the viewpoint of operators with home network

A. When buying roaming calls from foreign MNOs on the wholesale market,
Ai may decide to buy proportion γAi from operator B0 and proportion 1 − γAi
operator B1. Operator Ai's perceived marginal costs are:

in country
operator
from

cAi = γAi aB0 + (1 − γAi ) aB1

(33)

Since operators cannot discriminate the retail prices according to which host network
provides the roaming services, the per call price equals the perceived marginal costs:

62 Note that if only one operator in

A and Bj declares to form an alliance, Bi
ΠR∗ (c, a∗ (c)) > Π(a∗ (c), c).

strictly prefers to stay

alone as only one alliance can be created and

63 This specication is equivalent to the following assumption: Operators can direct their subscribers

to the desired foreign network only with probability

γ̃ ∈ [0, 1].

The remaining subscribers are assigned

randomly to the host networks. Then one immediatly sees that

γ = γ̃ + 21 (1 − γ̃) =

1
2

(1 + γ̃).

See also

Salsas and Koboldt (2004), section 3.5 for a slightly dierent assumption.
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p∗Ai = cAi . The equilibrium net surplus,

market shares and the retail equilibrium prots

remain as established in Lemma 1.
We now turn to the wholesale market.

No international alliances.

As discussed in sections 3 and 4, operators prefer to

buy roaming calls from the cheapest foreign operator.

∗
γAi

(
γ̄
=
1 − γ̄

if
if

aB0 < aB1
aB0 > aB1
Ai

We dene the optimized perceived marginal cost of operator

as the cheapest

possible mean cost for roaming calls, given the posted prices of foreign operators:

c∗Ai = c∗ (aB0 , aB1 ) ≡ γ̄ min{aB0 , aB1 } + (1 − γ̄) max{aB0 , aB1 }
The main implication of imperfect host network selection is that operators may generate positive demand even when not oering the cheapest wholesale price. We assume
for simplicity that foreign operators divide the trac evenly among both domestic networks if these oer equal wholesale prices. Using the results of the retail equilibrium,
in absence of alliances the total wholesale demand of operator

NA

Ai(where the superscript

means no alliance) is:

A
QN
Ai



γ̄q ((1 − γ̄) aAj + γ̄aAi )
NA
= Q (aAi , aAj ) ≡ 21 q(aAi )


(1 − γ̄) q ((1 − γ̄) aAi + γ̄aAj )

if
if
if

aAi < aAj
aAi = aAj
aAi > aAj

Note that the demand is independent of the actual market share of the reselling
operators, since for all price combinations, both foreign operators purchase the same

Ai.
operator Ai

part of their trac at operator
The overall prot of

is therefore:

A
NA
ΠN
(aAi , aAj ) ≡ ΠR∗ (cAi , cAj ) + (aAi − c) QN A (aAi , aAj )
Ai = Π
Similar to section 4, in equilibrium each operator takes the foreign wholesale prices
and therefore its retail prots as given. Therefore operator Ai sets its wholesale price
(aAi − c) QN A (aAi , aAj ). Under the technical

in order to maximize its wholesale prot

assumption 3 of section 7, no pure strategy equilibrium obtains for

γ̄ ∈ (0.5, 1):

Lemma 17 Suppose that assumption 3 holds. For γ̄ ∈ (0.5, 1), there is no pure strategy
equilibrium.
Proof.

We rst show that there is no symmetric equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary
∗
∗
∗
that aA0 = aA1 . If aA0 = c, then increasing the own price increases wholesale prots. If
∗
aA0 > c, then undercutting slightly increases prots.
∗
We now show that there is no asymmetric equilibrium. Let p denote the maxi64
∗
∗
mizer of (p − c) q(p).
Suppose to the contrary w.l.o.g. that aA0 6= aA1 . Then there
∗
∗
exists an operator Ai such that aAi 6= p . But then there exists an âAi such that

64 Which exists by assumption 3.
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sign(âAi − aAj ) = sign(a∗Ai − aAj ) and |âAi − p∗ | < |a∗Ai − p∗ |. By assumption 3, this imNA
plies that (âAi − c) Q
(âAi , a∗Aj ) > (a∗Ai − c) QN A (a∗Ai , a∗Aj ) and therefore contradicts
equilibrium.
By symmetry and the usual Bertrand reasoning, there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which both operators set dierent wholesale prices. However, under imperfect network
selection the fully competitive equilibrium of section 4 vanishes and there is no other
equilibrium in which both operators set higher wholesale prices. Intuitively, there is no
∗
∗
equilibrium with aA0 = aA1 = c because deviating upwards generates strictly positive
wholesale prots.

Two international alliances.

Similar to section 5, we now analyze the equilibrium

outcome after operators with same location have formed two competing alliances. We
omit the country index for brevity.
We maintain all assumptions of the base model but assume that each member can
at most commit that a proportion

γ̄

of its subscribers uses the foreign partner network

to place roaming calls. Furthermore, we restrict operators to sell roaming calls on the
wholesale market to all foreign operators for the same price

ai

that is negotiated within

ai

and

an alliance.
If both alliances have negotiated the wholesale prices
wholesale demand for roaming calls of operator

i

aj ,

the equilibrium

is

Qi = Q(ai , aj ) ≡ γ̄n∗i q (γ̄ai + (1 − γ̄) aj ) + (1 − γ̄) (1 − n∗i ) q (γ̄aj + (1 − γ̄) ai )
where

n∗i =

1 σ
+ [v (γ̄ai + (1 − γ̄) aj ) − v (γ̄aj + (1 − γ̄) ai )]
2 3

is the equilibrium retail market share. The prot of each operator in alliance

Πi = Π(ai , aj ) ≡ ΠR∗ (ci , cj ) + (ai − c) [γ̄n∗i q (ci ) + (1 − γ̄) (1 − n∗i ) q (cj )]

i

is:

(34)

If both rms realize a strictly positive market share, the marginal prot with respect
to the own wholesale price is:

 ∗

∂Π
dn∗i
ni
(ai , aj ) = Q(ai , aj ) +
2 + (ai − c) (γ̄q(ci ) + (1 − γ̄) q(cj ))
∂ai
dai
σ
h
i
0
0
+(ai − c) γ̄ 2 n∗i q (ci ) + (1 − γ̄)2 (1 − n∗i ) q (cj )
with

dn∗i
σ
= ((1 − γ̄) q(cj ) − γ̄q(ci ))
dai
3
∗
∗
∗
symmetric equilibrium with ai = aj = a

Considering a
1
∗
as well as ni =
yields the following characterization:
2
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1 − 23 (2γ̄ − 1)
a∗ − c


=
a∗
γ̄ 2 + (1 − γ̄)2 ηq (a∗ ) + (2γ̄ − 1)2 ηn (a∗ )

(36)

ηq (·) is the price elasticity of the per customer demand and ηn (a∗ ) ≡ 32 σa∗ q(a∗ )
∗
is the price elasticity of the retail market share for aj = ai = a in case of perfect trac
where

direction.

65

Comparing (36) with the equilibrium characterization (14) of the base model reveals
that for the same wholesale price ai , the right hand side of (36) is always larger than
2
1
2
2
that of (14) since 1 − (2γ̄ − 1) ≥ , γ̄ + (1 − γ̄) ≤ 1 and (2γ̄ − 1) ≤ 1 hold. These
3
3
observations allow to establish that imperfect trac steering leads to higher equilibrium
wholesale prices:

Proposition 18 Suppose that assumption 2 holds. Then the equilibrium wholesale
price a∗ in any symmetric equilibrium is decreasing in the quality of the trac steering
technology (γ̄ ).
Proof.
Using (35) with

ai = aj

and

dn∗i
|
dai ai =aj

= σ3 q(ai ) (1 − 2γ̄)

and reordering, yields the

rst order condition

1−


2
(2γ̄ − 1) [1 + (2γ̄ − 1) σ (a∗ − c) q(a∗ )] − (a∗ ) γ̄ 2 + (1 − γ̄)2 = 0
3

As the the middle term is strictly negative for γ̄ > 0.5 and 0 for γ̄ = 0.5, it follows
2
∗
2
that (a ) γ̄ + (1 − γ̄)
< 1. Applying the implicit function theorem yields

da∗
2 [1 + 2σq(a∗ ) (a∗ − c)] + 2(a∗ ) (2γ̄ − 1)



=
dγ̄
− (2γ̄ − 1)2 σq(a∗ ) 1 − γ̄ 2 + (1 − γ̄)2 (a∗ ) − 32 γ̄ 2 + (1 − γ̄)2 0 (a∗ )
2
Clearly, the denominator of the right hand side is strictly negative since 1− γ̄ + (1 −
0
0 and  (a∗ ) ≥ 0 by assumption 2. The the numerator is strictly positive. Taken toda∗
< 0.
gether
dγ̄


γ̄)2 (a∗ ) >

Intuitively, there are two channels that cause a higher equilibrium price when network selection is imperfect ( γ̄

< 1).

Firstly, compared to the base model ( γ̄

= 1),

the

retail market share is less sensitive to increases of the wholesale price. This is because
the perceived marginal costs
wholesale price

ai

ci

of operators within alliance

i

depend less on the own

while the perceived marginal costs of operators of the rival alliance

j depend partly on ai . Secondly, under imperfect trac direction, operators of alliance
j have to procure a proportion 1 − γ̄ of their subscribers' roaming calls from alliance
i. When selling to non-alliance operators, the alliance does not take lower retail profits that are implied by a higher wholesale price into account, which renders a high
wholesale price more attractive.

65 Both

ηq (·)

and

ηn (a∗ )

are dened as in section 5.
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